The battle also sees more ammunition expended than the entire Franco-Prussian War. This along with similar reports from the Chinese Civil War will force all nations to dedicate far greater resources to logistical support in future.
Now, this all seems very reasonable and sensible. But you're probably aware that the European Powers, on the whole, were in no way reasonable or sensible about learning lessons from the Russo-Japanese war OTL.
As far as I understood it, they basically fell prey to 'Well, it'll be different here'. Doubtlessly, this was partially the result of inertia, lack of political will and racism ("Of course the [racial slur meaning 'Japanese'] expended so much ammunition. They're
Orientals! And the Russians, well. They're not far from jumped-up Mongols, don't you know? Dreadfully backwards, all things considered.")
I recall an anecdote, for example, about the Japanese using their Artillery for indirect fire in the Russo-Japanese war. A western advisor/observer, this either remarked in his reports or actually told the Japanese 'No no, you're doing it wrong. Direct fire is the thing to do!'
As far as I gather, European military thinking had drawn this large division between 'European' and 'Colonial' wars, and lessons regarding the latter could not be applied to the former. The Russo-Japanese war was mentally sorted as a Colonial War, and as such didn't really count as a
real war when it came to lessons learnt.
A similar trend can be observed in Machine Guns, as I understand it. Despite their use in the Russo-Japanese war, the 'European Military Establishment(s)' seemed to take the view that they'd be of only limited utility in European wars. (The reason given seemed to be that properly trained European troops could 'simply' snipe the Machine Gunners from long range, thus disabling them.)
The exception to this seemed to be the Russians, who entered WWI with the best Machine Gun doctrine, training and I think maybe also proliferation? (But again, apparently the Russians didn't count.)
The Franco-Prussian War might also be a driver for this... Inertial blindness, IIRC. There were plentiful European military observers in the American Civil War, of course, who came to the general conclusion of 'Wow, these Americans are kind of terrible at this.' It was thought that the reason the ACW was as entrenched, drawn-out and bloody as it was because the two armies were, frankly, amateurish and under-equipped. It was imagined that a 'proper' European Army would have had the whole thing wrapped up much quicker.
And then the Franco-Prussian War came along and seemed to prove all that thinking correct.
Or perhaps it was simply politics and finances. Expanding logistics, increasing shell production and stockpiling, buying more machine guns, training on them?
Difficult.
Expensive. Worse, perhaps, not
sexy. Ask the public whether they'd rather the country had a warehouse full of artillery shells, or another Battleship?
Honestly, I imagine that you could write a book on this phenomenon. (I imagine that some have been.) But whatever the causes, it seemed to be deeply entrenched, and I don't know how much TTL has shaken the Europeans out of it.