Why the Chinese play cricket (an Imperial Federation timeline)

Frankly the significant support the Chinese gave the Japanese in the OTL has always seemed curious to me. Not like the Japanese had any less designs on exploiting and dismembering China than the Russians. Only thing I can come up with is the Russians had been kicking the Chinese so much longer they hated them so much they just wanted to see the Russians get the crap beaten out of them. Regardless of the fact the Japanese would just take over from the Russians in kicking the Chinese.
Yeah, it seemed weird to me as well.
 
The battle also sees more ammunition expended than the entire Franco-Prussian War. This along with similar reports from the Chinese Civil War will force all nations to dedicate far greater resources to logistical support in future.
Now, this all seems very reasonable and sensible. But you're probably aware that the European Powers, on the whole, were in no way reasonable or sensible about learning lessons from the Russo-Japanese war OTL.

As far as I understood it, they basically fell prey to 'Well, it'll be different here'. Doubtlessly, this was partially the result of inertia, lack of political will and racism ("Of course the [racial slur meaning 'Japanese'] expended so much ammunition. They're Orientals! And the Russians, well. They're not far from jumped-up Mongols, don't you know? Dreadfully backwards, all things considered.")

I recall an anecdote, for example, about the Japanese using their Artillery for indirect fire in the Russo-Japanese war. A western advisor/observer, this either remarked in his reports or actually told the Japanese 'No no, you're doing it wrong. Direct fire is the thing to do!'

As far as I gather, European military thinking had drawn this large division between 'European' and 'Colonial' wars, and lessons regarding the latter could not be applied to the former. The Russo-Japanese war was mentally sorted as a Colonial War, and as such didn't really count as a real war when it came to lessons learnt.

A similar trend can be observed in Machine Guns, as I understand it. Despite their use in the Russo-Japanese war, the 'European Military Establishment(s)' seemed to take the view that they'd be of only limited utility in European wars. (The reason given seemed to be that properly trained European troops could 'simply' snipe the Machine Gunners from long range, thus disabling them.)

The exception to this seemed to be the Russians, who entered WWI with the best Machine Gun doctrine, training and I think maybe also proliferation? (But again, apparently the Russians didn't count.)

The Franco-Prussian War might also be a driver for this... Inertial blindness, IIRC. There were plentiful European military observers in the American Civil War, of course, who came to the general conclusion of 'Wow, these Americans are kind of terrible at this.' It was thought that the reason the ACW was as entrenched, drawn-out and bloody as it was because the two armies were, frankly, amateurish and under-equipped. It was imagined that a 'proper' European Army would have had the whole thing wrapped up much quicker.

And then the Franco-Prussian War came along and seemed to prove all that thinking correct.

Or perhaps it was simply politics and finances. Expanding logistics, increasing shell production and stockpiling, buying more machine guns, training on them? Difficult. Expensive. Worse, perhaps, not sexy. Ask the public whether they'd rather the country had a warehouse full of artillery shells, or another Battleship?

Honestly, I imagine that you could write a book on this phenomenon. (I imagine that some have been.) But whatever the causes, it seemed to be deeply entrenched, and I don't know how much TTL has shaken the Europeans out of it.
 
On European observations on the war, I've copied an ancient post of mine:
There were 13 British & Empire observers with the Japanese forces, and three with the Russian army, one with the navy. My source for this: Richard Connaughton's Rising Sun And Tumbling Bear (2003 pb rev ed of 1988 original), p69-70. More than anyone else.

Ian Hamilton, MA in Tokyo, accompanied the Japanese army in Manchuria.

Connaughton quotes (p 348) Philip Towle:
The British armed forces tried harder to learn from the Russo-Japanese War than from any other foreign war before or since, as the number of officers sent as observers and the number of official histories clearly demonstrated. But each observer tended to draw lessons which reinforced his own belief and the interests of his regiment or corps.
This is presumably from Towle's 2006 book From Ally to Enemy: Anglo-Japanese Military Relations 1900-1945, though there are no footnotes, and the work itself doesn't appear in the bibliography.

Edit: No, a 2003 edition wouldn't have anything from a 2006 book. obviously an uncredited article/monograph.

Brig James Jardine, commanding the 97th Brigade (32nd Div), had been an observer with the First IJA; pre-Somme, he told Rawly he wanted his men to be within 30-40 yards of the barrage - "that's what the Japanese did". The 17th HLI utilised this tactic on 1 July, and successfully got into the Leipzig Salient. (P 350-51)
 
Southern Quing also have the USA and Britain (as well as the burgeoning Imperial Federation) backing them right now the German horse is looking more favourable than the Russian one. Also doesn’t help the french though this whole mess puts them between a rock and a very hard place right now.
 
Well seems I was wrong about 1907.. When I started work on I was worried I would struggle to find sufficient details to make fill the year with and was expecting it to be rather boring. I couldn't have been more wrong. No less than three major developments, at least two I'd call game changing, with huge implications for the future development of the timeline. Sorry no spoilers other than who'd have thought it of Newfoundland. I know I have some comments to respond to, promise I'll get to them.
 
Well seems I was wrong about 1907.. When I started work on I was worried I would struggle to find sufficient details to make fill the year with and was expecting it to be rather boring. I couldn't have been more wrong. No less than three major developments, at least two I'd call game changing, with huge implications for the future development of the timeline. Sorry no spoilers other than who'd have thought it of Newfoundland. I know I have some comments to respond to, promise I'll get to them.
Take all the time you need. You'll get there.
 
Chine as at March 1904
China Civil War 0403.png

Base maps from Free SVG Maps and used under the terms of Creative Commons Attribution - Non-Commercial 4.0 Intentional
 
Take all the time you need. You'll get there.
Miss C's Design Notes #10 - Why the hell are the US allied with Japan against Britain and bizarre other things.

(This actually started as me dashing off a hastily reply to a fab encouraging comment. Unfortunately it turned into one of my rants)

One thing I do like about the period I'm working on now (first decade of the 20th C), is how despite it appears as if history has taken a sudden inexplicable lurch of the rails of the OTL with no readily apparent reason, what is actually happening is a loot of seemingly minor threads are coming together to throw history onto a radically different path. Take the US, they're behaving in a very un OTL like manner. Realpolitik is becoming common in US foreign policy, US Imperialism, which in the OTL virtually entirely mercantile has shifted towards traditional colonial imperialism (eg the US didn't turn Cuba into a puppet state ITTL, they annexed it outright as a colony). Also if you look at the three nations histories, cultures, political structure and geopolitical outlook, Japan and the US are naturally inclined to rivals and even enemies in this period. On the other hand the US Britain are naturally inclined to friends and even allies.

All three are Imperialistic, though Japanese imperialism is mostly focused on colonial territorial expansion, while the US and British Imperialism is focused on mercantile trading (yes the British did their fair share of colonial territorial expansion too, but generally the actual government had to be dragged kicking a screaming into it but enterprising gentlemen with dubious ethics and continually moaned about the costs). Japan shares virtually no common history or culture with the US or British, whereas they have a vast shared heritage. Both the US and Britain are democracies while Japan at this stage is ruled by a tiny tiny oligarchic elite. The only real areas British and US interest overlap is South America, China and the Pacific and the British have plenty to keep them occupied elsewhere. But Japan's primary focus is on China and the Pacific, which is two out of the three major areas of US interest. US and Japanese Imperialism should be on a collision course.

But ITTL, the US has forgone alliance with Britain, instead moving toward Japan as an ally. It doesn't seem to make sense unless you look a little deeper. There has always been a minor but not insignificant element of Anglophobia in US culture, lot of reasons, but it's there. ITTL that element has been amplified and expanded by a variety of factors. In this period there was a noticeable level hostility between Canada and the US. Things such as US access to Canadian fisheries, US protectionism and frequent abrogation of free trade agreements along with certain US politicians openly talking about annexing and absorbing Canada really got the US's well mannered northern neighbours backs up (albeit ever so politely).

The difference between Anglo-US relations ITTL and in the OTL is due to many small seemingly insignificant factors. Firstly despite it appearing as if the Great Anglo-American Rapprochement has happened or even gone further ITTL, it actually has gone much less far. A big part of that Rapprochement's success was due to the British willingness to compromise more toward the US position than the other way round. The British were constantly throwing Canada under the bus to cozy up with the US and in South America the British almost always at least tacitly accepted the Monroe doctrine and the US interpretation of it, despite things such as the Roosevelt corollary or the Otley interpretation really stretching passed what should have been breaking point. Neither of those things have happened ITTL, the British have backed the Canadians every time and when the US starts calling Monroe doctrine to throw it's weight around, the British have very diplomatically but firmly rejected over stretching the Monroe Doctrine (though taking great care to lave enough wiggle room to avoid backing the US into a corner, a favour the US have returned).

You also have the dark years of the Blaine presidency, where a US President went round overthrowing local regimes and annexing them with the express intention of gaining exclusive control of markets and strategic resources or region. Along with actively trying to force the British out of their extremely lucrative South American markets due to his utterly unfounded paranoia. This, kick started the noticeably increased acceptance of Imperialism in the US. and its shift toward colonial expansion (US Imperialism is still primarily mercantile ITTL but it's far loser to the British model than the OTL). Plus giving a massive shot in the arm to the afore mention thread of Anglophobia in US culture. Then you have the initially small but ever growing diversion of British investment from the US and South America into China and the Empire, which has been slowly starving the US of capital and hindering its economic growth.

Then you have a fundamental change in British geopolitical focus. In the OTL Britain saw the Empire, Asia, South America etc mainly as raw material sources and dumping grounds for British manufactured goods. Yes they did sell their widgets there, but the British primary trade partners were the US and Europe. ITTL, they've moved away from that, actively developing India, the white dominions, China, the ABC powers in South America etc as viable alternative trade partners. They are actively trying to move these places away from dependence on primary industries to increase their wealth, so they can afford to buy larger quantities of British widgets than they could as simple resource providers. This means whereas in the OTL the British were happy to take a back seat in regions the US regarded as it's backyard or natural market such as South America, China and the Pacific. These regions ITTL are far more important to the British. At the moment the two powers are largely cooperating to keep the other Europeans such as France, Germany and Russia out. But there's a Great War coming that's going utterly munt Europe for some time, leaving the British to face off in those regions. Watch this space.

If you look you'll find similar seemingly minor threads explaining other head scratchers such what the hell is going on with France? Why are the Tories doing so badly in UK politics? Where did all the Chinese Warlords go? Why are the British being so nice in India? How are the dominions industrialising so successfully? etc. And there's more of come such as how did Germany avoid the stab in the back myth when they lost and why did the French develop it when they won? Why is Italy a military and economic superpower? I'm really enjoying this timeline despite all the electric cattle prods and truck batteries I have to use to keep it in line lol.
 
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Now, this all seems very reasonable and sensible. But you're probably aware that the European Powers, on the whole, were in no way reasonable or sensible about learning lessons from the Russo-Japanese war OTL.

As far as I understood it, they basically fell prey to 'Well, it'll be different here'. Doubtlessly, this was partially the result of inertia, lack of political will and racism ("Of course the [racial slur meaning 'Japanese'] expended so much ammunition. They're Orientals! And the Russians, well. They're not far from jumped-up Mongols, don't you know? Dreadfully backwards, all things considered.")
Like all hierarchical organisations, militaries tend strongly toward conservatism, even more than most I'd say. The "well it worked for my grandfather, so it'll damn well work now" principle. There is even value in this approach, if it in fact still works, why change it. Crossing the T was an effective naval tactic for centuries, and the maxim " don' t tap it, thump it" still has considerable value. Also a lot to be said for not changing things until you have good evidence they need changing. The unfortunate problem is this is when its combined with a sonority based hierarchy, as almost all militaries are, the ones in command tend to be the older ones. While I'm well aware older people (of whom I'm one lol) can be highly innovative and open to new ideas, they are less likely to be so than younger people. I'm sure more than one general in the late 19th and early 20th C went, "hah, machine guns, piffle. A few volleys of well aimed rifle fire followed up by a lusty bayonet change has carried the day since Napoleon's time, so it's all we need to day."

And another sad fact is people are extremely good at manufacturing supposed good arguments to support their long established beliefs and habits, so GIGO. I'm also well aware this mentality afflicted most of the European and Euroclone (basically any non Euro nation who wanted a seat at the table) in the the lat 19th and early 20th C. How often was von Bredow's death ride presented as justification for massed arm blanche cavalry charges after the F-P war. Another factor to take into account is the almost universal reliance on mass conscript armies. You have a year, maybe two to train the vast bulk of your troops, not a situation conducive to experimenting with new innovative tactics or technology. This where long service professional armies have the advantage. While they can be every bit sas hide bound as a conscript army, they're much better placed to learn and develop new methods when tried and true fails. Both the US army and British army introduced profound changes after the S-A and Ber wars respectively. In this case the British and US will be best placed to learn from the two wars in China. But here we run smack into another factor, seeing is a vastly different and inferior teacher when compared with participating.
Or perhaps it was simply politics and finances. Expanding logistics, increasing shell production and stockpiling, buying more machine guns, training on them? Difficult. Expensive. Worse, perhaps, not sexy. Ask the public whether they'd rather the country had a warehouse full of artillery shells, or another Battleship?

Well yes another vitally important factor, army auditing departments and quartermasters are notoriously stingy when it comes to ' consumable' such as bullets and shells. Prior to the Great War, numerous foreign officers commented on how massively superior British musketry was compared with everyone else and equally well aware of why "their men get to shoot their rifles 250 times a year, ours get to shoot them 50 times a year, of course they're far better at it, why don't we do that?" but when it came time to pay for those extra 200 rounds to do that, nobody wanted to stump out the cash. Of course this might have something to do with the British have 200,000 men to supply 250 rounds per year to, everybody else had millions lol.
 
On European observations on the war, I've copied an ancient post of mine:
lol yes the GIGo issue, goes well with the "it worked last war, I'm sure it'll work this war too" and the famous "Hey it worked when General Dunderhead did it at the Battle of Suicidal Insanity, lets ignore the other 99 times it was tried and didn't work. Obviously it didn't work then t because they weren't doing it right / didn't sufficient elan / where too timid etc those 99 times."
 
Southern Quing also have the USA and Britain (as well as the burgeoning Imperial Federation) backing them right now the German horse is looking more favourable than the Russian one. Also doesn’t help the french though this whole mess puts them between a rock and a very hard place right now.
Well the Northern Qing have been happily cancelling British and US interests and concessions, then handing them out to the Germans and Russians for a number of years now, so they can probably rule them out as Great Power backers. The Germans and Russian though are definitely eying up northern China for the juiciest portions to bite off and swallow up. So okay as a short term backer, but keep an eye on your back and count your fingers. The Japanese on the other hand definitely have ambitions regarding Manchuria, but they're also heavily reliant on their alliance with the mercantile powers of the US and Britain who are none to keen on other powers outright occupying and establishing exclusive economic control over valuable chunks of China
 
Another point hidden in scattered entries throughout the timeline is the huge fundamental change occurring with the Empire's industry and economy. Ever since the early 1870s Britain has been slowly shifting it's low-tech and low-skill industries such as textile mills, mass production of simple basic goods, garment manufacture etc out of Britain and the Dominions into India the colonies and regions such as South America. Of course they're still owned and controlled by British and Dominion interests, but they're located in places with plentiful cheap labour, often close to the necessary raw materials.

The medium-tech and medium-skill industries like commercial shipbuilding, general machine tool production, quality goods manufacture etc are now begin to move to the parts of the Empire when education levels are high enough to provide workers capable of being trained for such things. A lot will end up in India (where you can find a plentiful supply of both low-skill and medium-skill workers) and South Africa (there the large non-white population fits the role, white the white population provides high-skill workers).

Meanwhile Britain and the Dominions industries are focusing on high-tech and high-skill industries such as military ship building, electronics, communications, precision machine tools and instruments, aeronautics etc. And finally, as the Empire's economy grows so does the need for capital and specialist administrative services. At the moment these are still being concentrated in the UK while the Dominions industrialise. But eventually these will be spread out to the Dominions as well (first and foremost Canada, and then Australia which is hub to so many Imperial communication lines it rivals Britain).

Naturally the Dominions won't be totally empty of low tech industries, most of them also hold vast reserves of strategic raw materials and it makes economic sense to process them nearby. But the work force for those will likely eventually be primarily provided by temporary migrant workers from the colonies. Of course this will inevitably create a racial and cultural timebomb waiting to explode at some point in the long term.
 
Like all hierarchical organisations, militaries tend strongly toward conservatism, even more than most I'd say. The "well it worked for my grandfather, so it'll damn well work now" principle. There is even value in this approach, if it in fact still works, why change it. Crossing the T was an effective naval tactic for centuries, and the maxim " don' t tap it, thump it" still has considerable value. Also a lot to be said for not changing things until you have good evidence they need changing. The unfortunate problem is this is when its combined with a sonority based hierarchy, as almost all militaries are, the ones in command tend to be the older ones. While I'm well aware older people (of whom I'm one lol) can be highly innovative and open to new ideas, they are less likely to be so than younger people. I'm sure more than one general in the late 19th and early 20th C went, "hah, machine guns, piffle. A few volleys of well aimed rifle fire followed up by a lusty bayonet change has carried the day since Napoleon's time, so it's all we need to day."

And another sad fact is people are extremely good at manufacturing supposed good arguments to support their long established beliefs and habits, so GIGO. I'm also well aware this mentality afflicted most of the European and Euroclone (basically any non Euro nation who wanted a seat at the table) in the the lat 19th and early 20th C. How often was von Bredow's death ride presented as justification for massed arm blanche cavalry charges after the F-P war. Another factor to take into account is the almost universal reliance on mass conscript armies. You have a year, maybe two to train the vast bulk of your troops, not a situation conducive to experimenting with new innovative tactics or technology. This where long service professional armies have the advantage. While they can be every bit sas hide bound as a conscript army, they're much better placed to learn and develop new methods when tried and true fails. Both the US army and British army introduced profound changes after the S-A and Ber wars respectively. In this case the British and US will be best placed to learn from the two wars in China. But here we run smack into another factor, seeing is a vastly different and inferior teacher when compared with participating.


Well yes another vitally important factor, army auditing departments and quartermasters are notoriously stingy when it comes to ' consumable' such as bullets and shells. Prior to the Great War, numerous foreign officers commented on how massively superior British musketry was compared with everyone else and equally well aware of why "their men get to shoot their rifles 250 times a year, ours get to shoot them 50 times a year, of course they're far better at it, why don't we do that?" but when it came time to pay for those extra 200 rounds to do that, nobody wanted to stump out the cash. Of course this might have something to do with the British have 200,000 men to supply 250 rounds per year to, everybody else had millions lol.
There is a quote by Liddle-Hart

"The only thing more difficult than getting a new idea into the military is getting an old idea out of the military"
 
A somewhat heavily modified version of the OTL support, but yes. The Chinese did provide food, auxiliary militia to fight and critically important intelligence. Here the motives are different, supplies have been added and the auxiliary militia is better organised and equipped.

Frankly the significant support the Chinese gave the Japanese in the OTL has always seemed curious to me. Not like the Japanese had any less designs on exploiting and dismembering China than the Russians. Only thing I can come up with is the Russians had been kicking the Chinese so much longer they hated them so much they just wanted to see the Russians get the crap beaten out of them. Regardless of the fact the Japanese would just take over from the Russians in kicking the Chinese.

Hopefully ITTL the motives are a little more logical. The initial Northern Qing support for Russia got them vital military hardware and they did desperately need to get a Great Power backer. Yuan's switch also makes sense. At this point, the military situation is running somewhat in Japan's favour, they did support Yuan's coup, the need for a Greater Power back is even more desperate with the collapse in Hunan, and there is a chance the need to retain US support may moderate Japanese ambitions to some degree.

And the Southern Qing fight back has been coming some time. They just had to hold out long enough for their advantages (better organisation, training, equipment etc) to kick in. Now it has, the tide has definitely turned.
My uneducated guess was that they looked less foreign and a good deal of them already had grasp of Chinese culture, especially the officers.
 
My uneducated guess was that they looked less foreign and a good deal of them already had grasp of Chinese culture, especially the officers.
Yesterday I actually stumbled across a paper on it by Gotelind Muller titles Chinese perspective of the Russo-Japanese War. Fascinating reading. He listed several factors of which shared heritage was one.
 
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