I read somewhere that the main reason for Besa was that the barrel could be changed from the inside and availble now
Sir John Valentine Carden Survives. Part 2.
- Thread starter allanpcameron
- Start date
10 March 1942. London, England.
allanpcameron
Donor
10 March 1942. London, England.
The fall-out from the recent exercise on Salisbury Plain was still reverberating around the army, even to the highest level in the War Office. General Alan Brooke had Major-General Oliver Leese and Lieutenant-General Bernard Montgomery waiting outside his office. He couldn’t help feel like a head-master about to give two badly behaved pupils ‘six of the best’ for their behaviour.
The exercise itself had done exactly what any exercise should do: have plenty of lessons to learn from. The independence of the Umpires had been undermined by Montgomery, something like the shenanigans with the Mobile Force back in the 30’s. Montgomery had ‘won’ the exercise, but it was clear it wasn’t fair, and in fact, he had very seriously failed in the primary objectives. As an artillery man, Brooke could see that XII Corps’ overwhelming artillery power should have prevented Leese from winning, but, while overwhelming, the Royal Artillery wasn’t a preternatural power as the Umpires would have had it.
The Mixed Division (one Armoured Brigade and two Infantry Brigades) was found to be too unwieldly. Until such time as the Infantry Brigades had enough armoured vehicles to match the speed of the tanks, it was just too difficult to coordinate. The Guards Armoured Division did have its infantry in suitable vehicles, and they managed to take on the Mixed Division piecemeal, even although on paper they were the weaker force.
The most effective formation in XII Corps was 53rd (Welsh) Division, along with 25th Tank Brigade. The army had more experience of tank/infantry cooperation of this nature, and Leese’s counterattack ran out of steam when they came up against the dug in and well-prepared Welshmen, whose artillery did indeed act as a deciding factor.
Montgomery and Leese had a very public spat at the debrief about Leese’s use of signal intelligence. Montgomery’s HQ was identified and attacked because of lax radio procedures. Embarrassed by this, Montgomery had called Leese a cheat in front of Brooke and other senior officers. It had already been made clear that the Umpires had been nobbled by XII Corps, so calling the opposition force commander a cheat was, to Brooke’s mind, the pot calling the kettle black.
The Canadian No 1 Special Wireless Section (Type C) had distinguished themselves during the exercise. If there was one lesson that the army had to take seriously was the need for strict radio security. This type of Wireless Section was to be expanded so that at least every Corps would have one, the only changes was the need to have enough interpreters to listen into enemy conversations. Signals Intelligence was already a known and trusted part of the army’s operations. Brooke had already had the heads of the Intelligence Corps and Royal Signals in to hammer home the message that this needed to be strengthened and sharpened. As well as interception, the Canadians had managed some really good direction-finding results. The RAF’s Intelligence had also been copied into this discussion, part of the reason for Montgomery’s HQ being discovered was the length of time the RAF liaison officers spent guiding in the army cooperation aircraft.
In Brooke’s mind, Leese was no doubt conceited about his Guards Armoured Division being ‘elite’. It was a cheeky move to gain the Canadian Wireless group without letting on, but Montgomery had made a fool of himself. Leese, like Montgomery had done a good job in Flanders in the fallback to Dunkirk, and had previously been one of Montgomery’s instructors at staff college back in the 1920’s. The two men had a fairly good relationship up until this exercise, and Brooke was a bit concerned about Montgomery’s over-reaction.
What was worse, from Brooke’s perspective was Montgomery trying to shift the blame for his loss onto others, rather than taking ownership of his own failure. Whereas his infantry did well, Montgomery hadn’t shown that he had a firm enough command of the use of tanks in his plan. It was a problem throughout the leadership of the army, there just wasn’t a consensus about how to use tanks properly. O’Connor’s example was all very well, but tank warfare in North Africa primarily against the Italians, wasn’t going to be transferrable to Europe and against the Wehrmacht. Until tank doctrine was worked out, then hopefully all senior officers would be on the same page. Working it out in exercises on Salisbury Plain was better than picking up the pieces after a disaster on the battlefield. Therefore, he couldn’t be too hard on either Montgomery or Leese, but he settled himself into the headmaster’s role to give them both a good talking to, and make them shake hands, at least figuratively.
The fall-out from the recent exercise on Salisbury Plain was still reverberating around the army, even to the highest level in the War Office. General Alan Brooke had Major-General Oliver Leese and Lieutenant-General Bernard Montgomery waiting outside his office. He couldn’t help feel like a head-master about to give two badly behaved pupils ‘six of the best’ for their behaviour.
The exercise itself had done exactly what any exercise should do: have plenty of lessons to learn from. The independence of the Umpires had been undermined by Montgomery, something like the shenanigans with the Mobile Force back in the 30’s. Montgomery had ‘won’ the exercise, but it was clear it wasn’t fair, and in fact, he had very seriously failed in the primary objectives. As an artillery man, Brooke could see that XII Corps’ overwhelming artillery power should have prevented Leese from winning, but, while overwhelming, the Royal Artillery wasn’t a preternatural power as the Umpires would have had it.
The Mixed Division (one Armoured Brigade and two Infantry Brigades) was found to be too unwieldly. Until such time as the Infantry Brigades had enough armoured vehicles to match the speed of the tanks, it was just too difficult to coordinate. The Guards Armoured Division did have its infantry in suitable vehicles, and they managed to take on the Mixed Division piecemeal, even although on paper they were the weaker force.
The most effective formation in XII Corps was 53rd (Welsh) Division, along with 25th Tank Brigade. The army had more experience of tank/infantry cooperation of this nature, and Leese’s counterattack ran out of steam when they came up against the dug in and well-prepared Welshmen, whose artillery did indeed act as a deciding factor.
Montgomery and Leese had a very public spat at the debrief about Leese’s use of signal intelligence. Montgomery’s HQ was identified and attacked because of lax radio procedures. Embarrassed by this, Montgomery had called Leese a cheat in front of Brooke and other senior officers. It had already been made clear that the Umpires had been nobbled by XII Corps, so calling the opposition force commander a cheat was, to Brooke’s mind, the pot calling the kettle black.
The Canadian No 1 Special Wireless Section (Type C) had distinguished themselves during the exercise. If there was one lesson that the army had to take seriously was the need for strict radio security. This type of Wireless Section was to be expanded so that at least every Corps would have one, the only changes was the need to have enough interpreters to listen into enemy conversations. Signals Intelligence was already a known and trusted part of the army’s operations. Brooke had already had the heads of the Intelligence Corps and Royal Signals in to hammer home the message that this needed to be strengthened and sharpened. As well as interception, the Canadians had managed some really good direction-finding results. The RAF’s Intelligence had also been copied into this discussion, part of the reason for Montgomery’s HQ being discovered was the length of time the RAF liaison officers spent guiding in the army cooperation aircraft.
In Brooke’s mind, Leese was no doubt conceited about his Guards Armoured Division being ‘elite’. It was a cheeky move to gain the Canadian Wireless group without letting on, but Montgomery had made a fool of himself. Leese, like Montgomery had done a good job in Flanders in the fallback to Dunkirk, and had previously been one of Montgomery’s instructors at staff college back in the 1920’s. The two men had a fairly good relationship up until this exercise, and Brooke was a bit concerned about Montgomery’s over-reaction.
What was worse, from Brooke’s perspective was Montgomery trying to shift the blame for his loss onto others, rather than taking ownership of his own failure. Whereas his infantry did well, Montgomery hadn’t shown that he had a firm enough command of the use of tanks in his plan. It was a problem throughout the leadership of the army, there just wasn’t a consensus about how to use tanks properly. O’Connor’s example was all very well, but tank warfare in North Africa primarily against the Italians, wasn’t going to be transferrable to Europe and against the Wehrmacht. Until tank doctrine was worked out, then hopefully all senior officers would be on the same page. Working it out in exercises on Salisbury Plain was better than picking up the pieces after a disaster on the battlefield. Therefore, he couldn’t be too hard on either Montgomery or Leese, but he settled himself into the headmaster’s role to give them both a good talking to, and make them shake hands, at least figuratively.
Ramp-Rat
Monthly Donor
Basically no, the BESA used rimless ammunition and to switch it to rimed ammunition and a totally different feed system is far more trouble than it’s worth. Had the British switched from rimed 303 to rimless 303 at the end of WWI, a round that had been developed, a lot of the problems that they had, such as trying to develop a semi automatic rifle using rimed ammunition, would have been eliminated.
RR.
Probably, .30-06 is not suitable for a fully automatic rifle ( simply too powerful for good shoulder fire ) and the US will not accept a foreign round ( the OTL competition was a farce, the US umpires just kept changing things till the US won ). So with less pressure ( ie not being totally bankrupt ) , they will stick with the EM-2.
Unlikely I think. The same geopolitical situation is likely to exist post WW2 ITTL as existed in the OTL. Yes borders are more than likely going to be different etc but the general situation will remain.
That will drive the need for some form of standardisation and America will still be the big player and force it's own round on the rest of NATO.
The problem the British had in the OTL was that they were trying to play fair in a rigged game. There were possibly ways for them to get their own round adopted but it would basically have required an entirely different approach. I don't see how that sort of change could occur ITTL.
Ah, but the Americans don't have a damn say if the British are developing a second cartridge, in addition to the standard rifle-power one.
That is sort of the direction I was suggesting as a way for Britain to get it's round in service, if not official NATO. At least not official NATO initially.
The .280 whilst starting in a reasonable place was ruined by consistent attempts to improve performance to satisfy the Americans. The better starting place however would probably have been the .270 British. This fired a 100 grain projectile at 2800fps, so not a slouch but not a performer at long range either. The .270 was dropped fairly quickly however, had it not been dropped but instead shrunk down a bit to say 100 grain at 2600fps then it is in a nice spot. Combine it with the paratrooper variant of the EM2 and you have essentially a big SMG, or at least you can claim that. That round would need a partner for MMG's so things like vehicle weapons and sniper rifles etc which could have easily been the .308. The Americans get their round and rifle, Britain gets it's round and rifle, everyone is happy. It is also likely that America may have belatedly followed suite if the rest of NATO quietly went down the two cartridge standard.
The only real issue is that the EM2 was quite complex and not ready for cheap mass production so some sort of back up would be needed. A shorter barrel inch pattern FAL would have been a better all round weapon as much as I do love the EM2.
Ramp-Rat
Monthly Donor
The basic problem with the introduction of the EM2 in .280, was that the British didn’t introduce it earlier, before the establishment of NATO, with the three original nations involved, Britain, Canada and Belgium. So that by the time NATO is established, not only will the rifle be the standard for these three nations, there is a good chance that a number of other European nations and a substantial number of their colonies will standardised on this rifle and caliber. If such a Time Line existed, the Americans would find themselves facing multiple nations that have established their rifle policy around this weapon and its ammunition. Thus you would ether with two different ammunition types, with the Americans eventually having to adopt the smaller caliber as its new standard. Or the Americans sticking to their guns and then eventually picking a totally different caliber for the new lightweight fully automatic rifle.
RR.
RR.
Apparently the RN didn't shift spares around like other forces. Standard RN procedure was for many spares to be custom-made at their naval bases around the world or on board ship (at least for cruisers and above) as required. They tended to carry a lot of detailed plans and could also just copy the parts that required replacement. As noted above, places like Sydney could do specialised high-end stuff like building new propeller shafts for cruisers etc if my memory is correct. Dockyards like Simonstown (South Africa), Trincomalee, Bombay, Durban, Port Said, etc could do major repairs for difficult issues like serious bomb damage on cruisers, in less time than it would have taken spares to be delivered from the UK even if they were kept in stock there.
A badly damaged ship (say, Orion after Crete) may require six months dockyard time or much more if it's been torpedoed, but that's a lot less than the three years or so required to build a new vessel. A modern RN destroyer typically needed 3 months repair time for shell damage, 8 months for a torpedo hit, and 6 month for bombs. Again, that is dramatically quicker than building a new ship. Figures from DK Brown, Nelson to Vanguard.
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Come on. We all know the correct answer is a water cooled Vickers in an armored sheath.
Ramp-Rat
Monthly Donor
The recent exercise that has taken place on Salisbury Plain, despite the inevitable spat between the opposing commanding generals, has thrown up a number of very interesting points. Not only will it have been the largest exercise undertaken by the British army in history, it has by involving the RAF, been the largest combined exercise ever. While IOTL these two Generals had friendly relations, and worked well together, the strain of this exercise along with the fact that they are both former instructors at staff colleges, and infantry officers lacking armoured experience. Is telling as both of them are letting their emotions run away with them, and are saying things that if they had had the time to think about it, they would never have said. Brook has along with the task of fully evaluating the exercise, the task of forcing these two brilliant officers to make up, both for their own sakes and for the sake of the Army in general. The last thing the Army needs is a Fisher Beresford type split, with officers failing into two camps. The vital lessons that have arisen from the exercise, such as the need to improve communications discipline and security, that infantry without their own cross country capable transport are in the majority of Europe at a major disadvantage. Brook has a number of problems in addition to his principal of ensuring that Winston doesn’t do anything really stupid or commit Britain to things that look good but make no sense. Such as an early invasion of Europe at the insistence of the Americans and Soviets to relieve the pressure on the Soviets, or sending even more vital supplies and possibly British forces to Russia. An invasion of Norway or the Balkans because Winston is desperate to do something, irrespective if it will help the overall war effort. He also has to come down hard on Monty and his reluctance to accept responsibility for his failures in the recent exercise, while ensuring that Monty and Leese are kept as far apart as is possible for the immediate future. While ensuring that the lessons of the exercise are learned and absorbed by the Army and Airforce in general, plus getting the production priorities reflect the needs of the Army. This reminder of 1942, is definitely needed to ensure the Army is adequately trained and equipped, and has the time to conduct more and larger exercises.
RR.
RR.
OTL, it was the North and East African campaigns, I think. Here it started earlier.
Ramp-Rat
Monthly Donor
Doubtful, while the British did have a number of designs for specialist ground attack aircraft, that resembled the WWI Vickers Gun Bus. In that they were single engine pushers, with a heavenly armoured cockpit and fuselage, none of them were even produced as a prototype. And in the end the British and the Americans realised that it was far cheaper to just add bomb/rocket mountings to existing fighters especially once they became more powerful and had cannons as apposed to machine guns fitted. It was only during the Vietnam war that the Americans designed the A-10 Warthog, while at the same time the British looked at a turboprop pusher ground attack aircraft.
RR.