Let's say that Hindenburg, either because he doesn't run or gets defeated by Wilhelm Marx, never becomes President of Germany. With a president more committed to the Wiemar Republic, is there any chance it could've survived? If that happens, how would the post Great Depression years look for Wiemar Germany? Or would the Great Depression have destroyed it no matter what?
WI: Hindenburg never becomes President
- Thread starter Mikeman
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Given that the Zentrum candidate Wilhelm Marx (who was also supported by the SPD and the DDP) almost defeated Hindenburg in the second round in 1925, I think it safe to say that Marx would have defeated any other candidate of the Right, such as Karl Jarres (the candidate of the DNVP and DVP in the first round). https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_presidential_election,_1925 Neither Jarres nor any other conservative candidate I can think of had anything like Hindenburg's prestige.
Would a President Wilhelm Marx mean no Hitler government? The answer is probably yes, provided Marx were re-elected in 1932. If he lost to Hitler, that would probably just mean a Hitler dictatorship a year early. Hindenburg's victory over Hitler was decisive--53.0-36.8 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_presidential_election,_1932 Marx would no doubt win by a narrower margin, but I still think he would win. And as I've said here before: I think that as late as 1932 Weimar democracy had a chance of surviving. As bad as the 1930 elections had been for the Weimar Republic, the three "anti-system" parties--the KPD, the NSDAP and the DNVP--only won 225 of the 577 seats in the Reichstag. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1930_German_federal_election The numbers were still there for a center-right government reluctantly sustained by the SPD--if the President was willing to support it. Unfortunately, Hindenburg was no longer willing to do so after he won re-election in 1932: he felt ashamed that he had lost his right-wing support of 1925 and had won only because of SPD and Zentrum backing. Hence he helped to bring about the fall of Brüning and new elections in July 1932 when the victory of the extremist parties made parliamentary democracy unsustainable. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/July_1932_German_federal_election With a more moderate president than Hindenburg, new Reichstag elections might not be necessary until September 1934, by which time the world economic recovery was well underway, and might have weakened the extremist parties.
Would a President Wilhelm Marx mean no Hitler government? The answer is probably yes, provided Marx were re-elected in 1932. If he lost to Hitler, that would probably just mean a Hitler dictatorship a year early. Hindenburg's victory over Hitler was decisive--53.0-36.8 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_presidential_election,_1932 Marx would no doubt win by a narrower margin, but I still think he would win. And as I've said here before: I think that as late as 1932 Weimar democracy had a chance of surviving. As bad as the 1930 elections had been for the Weimar Republic, the three "anti-system" parties--the KPD, the NSDAP and the DNVP--only won 225 of the 577 seats in the Reichstag. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1930_German_federal_election The numbers were still there for a center-right government reluctantly sustained by the SPD--if the President was willing to support it. Unfortunately, Hindenburg was no longer willing to do so after he won re-election in 1932: he felt ashamed that he had lost his right-wing support of 1925 and had won only because of SPD and Zentrum backing. Hence he helped to bring about the fall of Brüning and new elections in July 1932 when the victory of the extremist parties made parliamentary democracy unsustainable. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/July_1932_German_federal_election With a more moderate president than Hindenburg, new Reichstag elections might not be necessary until September 1934, by which time the world economic recovery was well underway, and might have weakened the extremist parties.
If Hindenburg doesn't run it's possible that Reinhard Scheer would step in as the conservative candidate. Scheer had considered running in 1921 and had even found support with the DVP for that idea, but it was decided to simply extend Eberts tenure so there was no election in 1921. He also was outspoken in his support for Hindenburg, as a result Hindenburg wrote him a letter in late 1928 that he wished for Scheer to be his successor and that he would support Scheer in 1932. Of course, Scheer's early death in November 1928 prevented that from happening.
Should Scheer win the election in 1925 his death would mean a presidential election in late 1928/early 1929 when the republic was at it's most stable. Any candidate whom the SPD, Zentrum and DDP decide to back would have excellent chances of winning that one. Assuming no death in office the next election would than be in late 1935/early 1936.
Should Scheer or Hindenburg lose to Marx things should still work out fine for the time being. What Marx (or any president really) does when the goverment of Hermann Müller collapses will be the big question. He might let parliament fight it out for some time or call for new elections quickly or take Hindenburgs approach and appoint a chancellor.
I would give Marx good chances of reelection, assuming that his management of the crisis isn't far worse than Hindenburgs.
Should Scheer win the election in 1925 his death would mean a presidential election in late 1928/early 1929 when the republic was at it's most stable. Any candidate whom the SPD, Zentrum and DDP decide to back would have excellent chances of winning that one. Assuming no death in office the next election would than be in late 1935/early 1936.
Should Scheer or Hindenburg lose to Marx things should still work out fine for the time being. What Marx (or any president really) does when the goverment of Hermann Müller collapses will be the big question. He might let parliament fight it out for some time or call for new elections quickly or take Hindenburgs approach and appoint a chancellor.
I would give Marx good chances of reelection, assuming that his management of the crisis isn't far worse than Hindenburgs.
Let's say that Hindenburg either chokes on a sandwich before the second round or that the KPD doesn't defy the Comintern and supports Marx as it was advised to do. Marx would clearly win the 1925 election. The first big decision for him would probably be the Expropriation of the Princes the following year. OTL Hindenburg did everything to sabotage the initiative and so it failed. If Marx would try to sabotage it like Hindenburg did, the big problem for him (unlike for Hindenburg) would be that many Zentrum members supported the expropriation of the princes and if he acts to aggressively against it, the SPD and KPD could make inroads into Zentrum voters.
Also Marx wouldn't be able to head two coalition governments from 1926 to 1928 as he did OTL. Would the SPD force him to take them into government earlier than IOTL (1928), only to break the coalition over the question of expropriation? There is also the question of how the expropriation of princes would have a political impact. In our timeline, expropriation of the princes was a massive mobilization option for the political left. Only the defeat weakened the self-confidence of the German left and allowed the right to slowly take the political initiative. If the expropriation of the princes succeeded, the SPD and KPD would be massively strengthened and their selective cooperation in this question could nip the KPD's social fascism course in the bud, because one would not need an excuse why the expropriation of the prince failed.
Anything beyond that will be difficult to predict: will the KPD and SPD use their strength and forge political alliances again? How does the right react? And how does Marx behave as President of the Reich on the one hand and a member of a party that is threatened to be crushed by both sides in this conflict?
Also Marx wouldn't be able to head two coalition governments from 1926 to 1928 as he did OTL. Would the SPD force him to take them into government earlier than IOTL (1928), only to break the coalition over the question of expropriation? There is also the question of how the expropriation of princes would have a political impact. In our timeline, expropriation of the princes was a massive mobilization option for the political left. Only the defeat weakened the self-confidence of the German left and allowed the right to slowly take the political initiative. If the expropriation of the princes succeeded, the SPD and KPD would be massively strengthened and their selective cooperation in this question could nip the KPD's social fascism course in the bud, because one would not need an excuse why the expropriation of the prince failed.
Anything beyond that will be difficult to predict: will the KPD and SPD use their strength and forge political alliances again? How does the right react? And how does Marx behave as President of the Reich on the one hand and a member of a party that is threatened to be crushed by both sides in this conflict?
Two problems with Scheer: First, given the narrowness with which Hindenburg won, I doubt that Scheer--a war hero, yes, but not really with Hindenburg's prestige--could have won in the second round even if all the right-of-center parties had united around him. Second, and most important, Stresemann--who would brook no rivals within the DVP-- would almost certainly have opposed Scheer. As Henry Ashby Turner writes in Stresemann and the Politics of the Weimar Republic, pp. 230-1:
"Curtius, who remained as Minister of Economics in the new cabinet, later complained in his memoirs about the fact that he had received less support from Stresemann in his bid for the chancellorship than Marx. His conclusion was that, as Foreign Minister, Stresemann feared he would be a more forceful Chancellor than Marx and would thus want a larger voice in the formation and execution of foreign policy. Another possible explanation, however, could be that Stresemann was not pleased at the prospect of sharing the limelight within the DVP with a Chancellor or another ex-Chancellor. According to Hans von Raumer, a DVP deputy from 1920 until 1930, he was constantly apprehensive about possible rivals. On at least two earlier occasions he had shown himself extremely sensitive to challenges to his position of preeminence within the party. The first of these occurred in 1922, when Admiral Reinhard Scheer, a hero of the war, joined the DVP and opened an obvious bid for recognition with a series of speeches in various parts of the country. For a time Stresemann tolerated the Admiral's actions. But his patience quickly faded when Scheer aligned himself with the extreme left wing of the DVP and began criticizing him for not making more progress toward cooperation with the SPD. Reacting angrily, he brought the Admiral's bid for power to an abrupt end by securing a motion of censure against him from the Reichstag delegation. [In a footnote, Turner adds: "Scheer remained in the party for a time, but was completely without influence."] The second incident occurred in 1923 after the end of his own chancellorship, when President Ebert called upon Siegfried von Kardoff of the DVP to form a government. Kardoff accepted but had to withdraw at once in large part because, to his surprise, Stresemann refused to remain on as his Foreign Minister--although Stresemann then promptly agreed to do just that under the Centrist Marx. These two incidents, when added to Curtius' experience, would seem to substantiate Raumer's observation and to indicate that Stresemann preferred to remain as the DVP's one nationally prominent figure, even at the cost of sacrificing importamt increases in the party's strength and influence."
https://books.google.com/books?id=n0rWCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA230
https://books.google.com/books?id=n0rWCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA231
(If Scheer actually did urge the DVP to cooperate more with the SPD, I could see many German conservatives other than Stresemann who might have a problem with him...)
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Good points. And I agree, the election was so close it's hard to see anyone but Hindenburg beating Marx.