Sir John Valentine Carden survives.
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Derek Pullem
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@allanpcameron
21st was a regular division and was part of 7th Army reserves. It was missing its reconnaissance battalion which had been detached and a number of horses which would have slowed the deployment of its artillery but they were regulars.
The reference to "training command" is more indicative that they threw every body into the line at Boulogne - it was an integral part of the division tail.
http://france1940.free.fr/oob/7armee.html#army assets
If the Germans don`t get Norwau, I wonder where all the resources and labor of that Atlantic Wall will go instead.
Only in the South at this point. The Allies where winning in the North. Of course after Dunkirk OTL they bugged out. I suspect that will still be the case TTL. It would take the allies holding in Northern France for the Allies to make the decision to continue the Norwegian campaign (this is explored in PDF's most excellent Blunted Sickle TL).
I don't know about everything else but the amount of times The Blunted Sickle gets mentioned in TL and the forums perhap we should consider an abbreviating it! Perhaps BSTL?
Mind you a decent change to the timeline as to when the evacuation final convoys leave will probably save Glorious and a pair of destroyers to boot as the Scharnhorsts won't be at sea trying to hunt down the convoy when she leaves the area which is rather big
I agree. There is the possibility that the UK might feel that their performance against the Panzers means there half a chance France might hold. In such a scenario they might hold off evacuating Norway until France falls. Perhaps as the forces needed to hold Northern Norway are not great (although keeping them supplied would be a real effort) the British might decide to keep their forces there as there will be less invasion panic ITTL. The reason for going to Norway on the first place was to Deneb Narvik to the Germans which would be achieved if they stay put. It also allows them a toe hold on main land Europe which would be useful for propaganda purposes.
From Admiralty
To Captain HMS Glorious
CC OC Home Fleet
Re your request to proceed independently to the UK.
Request denied.
23 May 1940. 12:00hrs. Sant-Illiers-le-Bois, France.
allanpcameron
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23 May 1940. 12:00hrs. Sant-Illiers-le-Bois, France.
General Evans received the newest order from BEF GHQ. Entitled Special GHQ Operation Instruction No AFV.1. This informed Evans that “It is vital to safeguard the right flank of the BEF during its southern advance to cut German communications between Cambrai and Peronne.” Checking the map Evans saw that the Peronne was 23 miles southwest of Cambrai and 35 miles east of Amiens. The order continued, “Immediate advance of whatever elements of your division as are ready is essential. Action at once may be decisive: tomorrow may be too late. It is imperative to force the crossings over the River Somme on the left of the French Seventh Army as soon as possible in order to allow for your immediate advance towards St Pol so that you may cut the rear of the enemy who are about St Omer, and relieve the threat to the right of the BEF.”
With his staff, Evans couldn’t help but wonder about the idea that the BEF was advancing southwards to cut German communications. The withdrawal from the Escaut Line to the Franco-Belgian border, called by some the Gort Line, looked less like an advance southward and much more like a retreat. Evans looked to his intelligence officer to try to make sense of what was being asked of the Division. One of the many problems that he identified was the fact that intelligence was patchy at best. What was coming out of Belgium and London was confused and contradictory, and even less was being shared by their French allies.
Looking at the matter at hand, Evans and his staff couldn’t help but think that this was an exceptionally ambitious challenge for the puny force of one Armoured Regiment, for currently only the Queens Bays were active. Just in the early hours of the morning the 10th Hussars and 9th Lancers had arrived from Cherbourg. These two Regiments were still getting themselves off the trains that had brought them. Since the trains carrying the two Regiments hadn’t been loaded tactically Brigadier McCreery, commander of 2nd Armoured Brigade had informed Evans that the 9th Lancers and 10th Hussars wouldn’t be able to get on the road to join the Bays, some sixty miles away, until much later in the day. To show willing about fulfilling the order to prepare for an attack on the Somme, all Evans could do was to order the Queens Bays forward to hold a line on the River Bresle, southwest of the Somme, between Aumale and Blangy. This would be as far as they could go without refueling.
Evans was also very aware that the roads were clogged with refugees, making the road journey even slower. The best that Evans could hope for was for the Bays to proceed towards the Somme, once they had refuelled, with orders to carry out a reconnaissance in force to see whether a crossing of the Somme was possible by themselves. If not, they were to wait for the other two regiments of the Brigade, along with the 101st Regiment, to catch up. The three RTR Battalions were due to arrive in Cherbourg on the morning of 24 May, instead of going by train to Division HQ near Pacy-Sur-Eure, they would instead be brought closer to the 2nd Armoured Brigade’s position at some point later in the day, all being well. They too might be available, but probably not before 26 May.
Evans was called to Rouen to the Northern District HQ, called by Raymond Briggs, GSO I in GHQ(AFV), who had issued the order received earlier. The meeting was also attended by Acting Major General Archibald Beauman, the commander of the British Northern Area, and Major George Bolster. Bolster was part of the British liaison mission to the French High Command (GQC), and he was attending as representative of General Alphonse Georges, the Commander-in-Chief of Allied Forces Northwestern France.
Major Bolster again explained the situation and, along with Briggs, reiterated the vital necessity for immediate action, if necessary, at the cost of some sacrifice to the Bays. Beauman promised Evans that any attempt to force the river crossings on the Somme currently held by the Germans would be joined by three companies of infantry, from the 4th Battalion Border Regiment, who would arrive in their own transport, the next morning (24 May) to take over the crossings once the Bays had seized them. Evans informed the meeting that a Regiment of cruiser and light tanks, without infantry or artillery support would not be able to capture a crossing, in fact it was a recipe for a disaster. Being told that sacrifices had to be made, as the situation in the BEF was critical, Evans knew that Briggs had already formed a low opinion of him, without the drive necessary in wartime. Evans on the other hand knew that his command was an untested and undertrained Division, that was being asked to do something for which it was entirely unsuited. He tried to explain that if the infantry forced a crossing, which he wasn’t sure that three companies would be enough for, then the tanks of the Queens Bays could support them and then exploit the crossing.
There was no doubt in his mind that if Evans refused to obey the order he would be immediately be dismissed, so he agreed that he would order Brigadier McCreery to press on to the Somme. Leaving Rouen, Evans travelled to Martainville where the 2nd Armoured Brigade’s HQ was located. He explained to McCreery what the problem was and gave him verbal orders for the Brigade to move up to the River Somme, to find a crossing and form a bridgehead somewhere between Amiens and Abbeville. This, it was emphasised, was considered by higher command to be of vital importance as an effort to join up with the BEF near Doullens.
On receipt of his orders, and the chance of a private conversation between him and Evans, McCreery ordered the HQ to depart towards Neufchâtel-en-Bray, 28 miles to the north. McCreery himself in a scout car rode out to intercept the Queens Bays on their journey to Saint-Léger, finally catching up with Lt-Col Fanshawe, their commander, at Aumale. He gave verbal orders for Fanshawe to organise Light Tank and scout car patrols to reconnoitre the area between Drueil-lès-Amiens and Picquigny, in order to secure a bridge over the Somme. The remainder of the Queens Bays, whose progress had been slowed due to the refugees and French troop columns, were to divert to Camps-en-Amiénois, 18 miles south of Abbeville. From there, if reconnaissance showed a way of capturing a bridge and creating a bridgehead, then the Regiment should exploit it.
When the 9th Lancers and 10th Hussars got themselves off the trains, they were ordered to proceed to Airaines, a road march of 85 miles, to rendezvous with Queens Bays, a few miles south at Camps-en-Amiénois. They were told there was no time to lose, so they were only to have a brief stop during the night.
NB Text in italic differs from OTL. There are only minor changes here to summarise the days events. Briggs really didn't think much of Evans, and I'm presuming that Evans realises that the orders he is being given are panicky and dangerous. The 9th Lancers and 10th Hussars were planning on a proper overnight stop, but Briggs ordered them on carry on, with only time for a 2 hour stop, which wouldn't have allowed time for the general maintenance of the tanks after a day on their tracks or for the men to sleep.
General Evans received the newest order from BEF GHQ. Entitled Special GHQ Operation Instruction No AFV.1. This informed Evans that “It is vital to safeguard the right flank of the BEF during its southern advance to cut German communications between Cambrai and Peronne.” Checking the map Evans saw that the Peronne was 23 miles southwest of Cambrai and 35 miles east of Amiens. The order continued, “Immediate advance of whatever elements of your division as are ready is essential. Action at once may be decisive: tomorrow may be too late. It is imperative to force the crossings over the River Somme on the left of the French Seventh Army as soon as possible in order to allow for your immediate advance towards St Pol so that you may cut the rear of the enemy who are about St Omer, and relieve the threat to the right of the BEF.”
With his staff, Evans couldn’t help but wonder about the idea that the BEF was advancing southwards to cut German communications. The withdrawal from the Escaut Line to the Franco-Belgian border, called by some the Gort Line, looked less like an advance southward and much more like a retreat. Evans looked to his intelligence officer to try to make sense of what was being asked of the Division. One of the many problems that he identified was the fact that intelligence was patchy at best. What was coming out of Belgium and London was confused and contradictory, and even less was being shared by their French allies.
Looking at the matter at hand, Evans and his staff couldn’t help but think that this was an exceptionally ambitious challenge for the puny force of one Armoured Regiment, for currently only the Queens Bays were active. Just in the early hours of the morning the 10th Hussars and 9th Lancers had arrived from Cherbourg. These two Regiments were still getting themselves off the trains that had brought them. Since the trains carrying the two Regiments hadn’t been loaded tactically Brigadier McCreery, commander of 2nd Armoured Brigade had informed Evans that the 9th Lancers and 10th Hussars wouldn’t be able to get on the road to join the Bays, some sixty miles away, until much later in the day. To show willing about fulfilling the order to prepare for an attack on the Somme, all Evans could do was to order the Queens Bays forward to hold a line on the River Bresle, southwest of the Somme, between Aumale and Blangy. This would be as far as they could go without refueling.
Evans was also very aware that the roads were clogged with refugees, making the road journey even slower. The best that Evans could hope for was for the Bays to proceed towards the Somme, once they had refuelled, with orders to carry out a reconnaissance in force to see whether a crossing of the Somme was possible by themselves. If not, they were to wait for the other two regiments of the Brigade, along with the 101st Regiment, to catch up. The three RTR Battalions were due to arrive in Cherbourg on the morning of 24 May, instead of going by train to Division HQ near Pacy-Sur-Eure, they would instead be brought closer to the 2nd Armoured Brigade’s position at some point later in the day, all being well. They too might be available, but probably not before 26 May.
Evans was called to Rouen to the Northern District HQ, called by Raymond Briggs, GSO I in GHQ(AFV), who had issued the order received earlier. The meeting was also attended by Acting Major General Archibald Beauman, the commander of the British Northern Area, and Major George Bolster. Bolster was part of the British liaison mission to the French High Command (GQC), and he was attending as representative of General Alphonse Georges, the Commander-in-Chief of Allied Forces Northwestern France.
Major Bolster again explained the situation and, along with Briggs, reiterated the vital necessity for immediate action, if necessary, at the cost of some sacrifice to the Bays. Beauman promised Evans that any attempt to force the river crossings on the Somme currently held by the Germans would be joined by three companies of infantry, from the 4th Battalion Border Regiment, who would arrive in their own transport, the next morning (24 May) to take over the crossings once the Bays had seized them. Evans informed the meeting that a Regiment of cruiser and light tanks, without infantry or artillery support would not be able to capture a crossing, in fact it was a recipe for a disaster. Being told that sacrifices had to be made, as the situation in the BEF was critical, Evans knew that Briggs had already formed a low opinion of him, without the drive necessary in wartime. Evans on the other hand knew that his command was an untested and undertrained Division, that was being asked to do something for which it was entirely unsuited. He tried to explain that if the infantry forced a crossing, which he wasn’t sure that three companies would be enough for, then the tanks of the Queens Bays could support them and then exploit the crossing.
There was no doubt in his mind that if Evans refused to obey the order he would be immediately be dismissed, so he agreed that he would order Brigadier McCreery to press on to the Somme. Leaving Rouen, Evans travelled to Martainville where the 2nd Armoured Brigade’s HQ was located. He explained to McCreery what the problem was and gave him verbal orders for the Brigade to move up to the River Somme, to find a crossing and form a bridgehead somewhere between Amiens and Abbeville. This, it was emphasised, was considered by higher command to be of vital importance as an effort to join up with the BEF near Doullens.
On receipt of his orders, and the chance of a private conversation between him and Evans, McCreery ordered the HQ to depart towards Neufchâtel-en-Bray, 28 miles to the north. McCreery himself in a scout car rode out to intercept the Queens Bays on their journey to Saint-Léger, finally catching up with Lt-Col Fanshawe, their commander, at Aumale. He gave verbal orders for Fanshawe to organise Light Tank and scout car patrols to reconnoitre the area between Drueil-lès-Amiens and Picquigny, in order to secure a bridge over the Somme. The remainder of the Queens Bays, whose progress had been slowed due to the refugees and French troop columns, were to divert to Camps-en-Amiénois, 18 miles south of Abbeville. From there, if reconnaissance showed a way of capturing a bridge and creating a bridgehead, then the Regiment should exploit it.
When the 9th Lancers and 10th Hussars got themselves off the trains, they were ordered to proceed to Airaines, a road march of 85 miles, to rendezvous with Queens Bays, a few miles south at Camps-en-Amiénois. They were told there was no time to lose, so they were only to have a brief stop during the night.
NB Text in italic differs from OTL. There are only minor changes here to summarise the days events. Briggs really didn't think much of Evans, and I'm presuming that Evans realises that the orders he is being given are panicky and dangerous. The 9th Lancers and 10th Hussars were planning on a proper overnight stop, but Briggs ordered them on carry on, with only time for a 2 hour stop, which wouldn't have allowed time for the general maintenance of the tanks after a day on their tracks or for the men to sleep.
allanpcameron
Donor
Thanks for this. I see that they were at Hazebrouck on 10 May. I presume with the rest of 7e Army they went north to Breda as part of the Dyle Plan. I can't seem to find what happened to them, and I just wonder where they were that they were attacked by tanks while entrained for the move to Boulogne?
This trainwreck-in-the-making is a pretty good summary of the OTL British experience in the Battle of France - little planning, less communication, no coordination between units (still less between allies), no high-level understanding of the situation on the ground, ruinous underestimation of the enemy and the general idea that boldly advancing into the blue would somehow solve things.
The Allies may have had tanks and much of the German army might have been foot infantry with horse transport, but it was still a WW1 army trying to put up a fight against a WW2 one.
The Allies may have had tanks and much of the German army might have been foot infantry with horse transport, but it was still a WW1 army trying to put up a fight against a WW2 one.
Replace the BEF of 1940 with that of August 1918 man for man and give them the knowledge of how modern equipment works and they'd tear the Germans they encountered apart. Haig must have been turning in his grave at Gort's mens performance.
Oh and for such a request your status as commanding officer is to be reviewed
So I wonder what Evans said to McCreery, something like: 'The idiots in charge want you to do this and sacrifice your troops to achieve this, but that is stupid. Do it if you can, but don't over extend to the point that you can't make a fighting retreat if everything goes pear shaped.'
If the above is what Evans actually said, it might turn out like a feint or a spoiling attack that encourages the Panzers in the area to reorient towards them, drawing them on to the rest of the Brigade that is desperately trying to catch up with them.
If the above is what Evans actually said, it might turn out like a feint or a spoiling attack that encourages the Panzers in the area to reorient towards them, drawing them on to the rest of the Brigade that is desperately trying to catch up with them.
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