The can be little doubt that the Victor once it enters service, will be the tank that all others in Europe are compared with for the remainder of the war. And while it will not be produced in the same numbers as the American Sherman or Soviet T34, will be the third most produced tank of the conflict, and the principle tank of the British/Commonwealth forces for the duration. Britain which IOTL, started the war and finished it, with what many considered to be the best tanks of their era, Matilda and Centurion. Has managed to retain thanks to the survival of one man its position as a leader in tank design. The basic problems IOTL, were a combination of the losses in men and equipment suffered during the first three years of the war, and the terrible doctrine and tactics adopted by British armoured formations. ITTL not only did the British start out with more and better tanks, but have also suffered fewer losses in men and equipment. This has allowed the various industries that have switched over from their peacetime production to gain experience in armoured vehicle production under far less pressure than they were IOTL. Plus the better tanks already in production have enabled the British to achieve significant success in the Middle East, without suffering the extensive losses that they did IOTL. They have also been able to spare far more forces and equipment for the defence of their Far East possessions, and by retaining them their access to oil, rice and rubber. And the lower losses and reduced commitments in the Mediterranean, have allowed the designers to take more time and by also examining captured enemy equipment in producing the next generation of tanks.
The British armoured forces have gained valuable experience against both the Germans and Italians, and have had the time to absorb and think about the lessons taught them. The pause in large scale fighting in the Mediterranean, and the return to Britain of some of the more experienced officers and senior NCO’s, is allowing their hard won knowledge to be shared. Large scale exercises have been conducted in the UK and North Africa, to try out the various theories of how an armoured division should be formed and used, which given the recent experience are far more realistic than those conducted previously. British industry is not under the same pressure to produce tanks any tanks even if they are not as capable as they could be, to replace the constant stream of losses. And the army has been given the time and opportunity to absorb the numerous lessons that it has learned the hard way, and begin to develop a coherent doctrine and tactics in regards to armoured warfare. By the end of the year Britain will be deploying armoured formations that are in every way superior to those that Germany can field. Their tanks will be as good if not measurably better than any that the Germans can field, and much more mechanical reliable. While the standard British armoured division will not contain more active tanks than its German equivalent. It’s reserve tank park, with its tank transporters will have enough tanks to replace one day’s casualties, and quickly move said casualties to either a front line repair depot or a second line depot, picking up a replacement at the same time. Other than large AA guns, none of its artillery will be towed, and it will have organic specialist armoured vehicles, or they will be allocated from a central pool for an assault.
A British armoured division will have all their infantry support carried in half tracks or fully tracked armoured vehicles. Plus they will have at least twice the number of support vehicles in their service tail, some of which will be tracked. And will have a vertualy unlimited supply for fuel, ammunition and food, only being forced to ration them if they outrun their supply lines. In Normandy IOTL American and British armoured formations could have 50% of their armoured vehicles rendered combat ineffective in a single day, only to have them all replaced within 48 hours, whereas German formations on the eastern front would be lucky to receive 10% of the replacements needed after an attack. The level of air support a British or American formation could expect to receive was much greater than a German formation received during the Battle of France. No way could the Germans call upon a thousand heavy bombers to carry out a pre attack bombardment, closely followed by an overwhelming number of heavy guns pounding the area. By the end of 1942, the British and to a lesser extent the Americans for now, will have armoured devisions and corps that are larger than the Germans, mostly because of the extent of their support services. That are equipped, trained and have tactics and doctrine, equal to the Germans and in many cases better. As for tanks the Victor will remain given various upgrades the principal tank for the British/Commonwealth forces in Europe, and for the various Free forces as well, with the exception of France who will be mostly using American equipment. This will give the time to design and build a tank, engine and gun that will provide post war a vehicle that is better than any other in the world, and which will remain capable until the mid sixties.
RR.