No land border with any other Reich occupied territories (beyond the very far North of Norway) and by the time they did it the KM nolonger existed as an effective force. End result very little the Germans could do. Not the case for most other defectors sadly.
Sir John Valentine Carden Survives. Part 2.
- Thread starter allanpcameron
- Start date
Ramp-Rat
Monthly Donor
The Japanese have as much from desperation as any perceived advantage, launched a Banzai attack against an Indian Army force. This despite the knowledge that such attacks are very likely to fail, when tried against well trained and equipped forces. As experience against the Soviets, German trained Chinese Nationalist, and British forces in Malaya, has shown them repeatedly. The foolish idea that some had, that colonial forces would not fight for their masters, failed to take into account the history of the British Indian Army. Which had shown during its long history that it would fight, and fight hard against against any foe it was sent against. This is not a poorly equipped, badly trained and poorly led, colonial force, that is only fit for subduing a local uprising. It is a thoroughly professional force, responsible well equipped and competently led, with a long and proud history. In truth it is possible the equal of the Japanese army, if not better in some respects, as it doesn’t have the burden of the Japanese military culture. The Japanese are at the end of a long and torturous supply line, fighting alongside a distinctly unwilling ally, whose troops have little reason to give of their all. If the Japanese want to reenforce their forces in Thailand, they only have three options at present, withdraw troops from their ongoing conflict in China, remove and redeploy troops from the Philippines, or reduce their commitment in Malaya and use those troops in Thailand. The problem with all these options is that there are not the forces available, as they are fully committed to the conflict that they are presently involved in. And without succeeding in one of these campaigns there will not be troops available to be redeployed. The Japanese are while enjoying some success in the Pacific and around Borneo, are facing increasing challenges in the Philippines, and are complete disaster in Thailand, Burma and Malaya. And have only a short time to achieve their pre war goals, while the British having suffered a major blow, are now beginning to catch their second wind. And will shortly be providing the Japanese with some serious problems, including the possibility of the Thais switching sides.
RR.
RR.
Also the Philippines are valuable mainly to secure the SLOCs from the "Southern Resource Area" to the Home Islands. Provided the US forces left there are penned up securely and have no offensive power they're an irritant rather than a real problem. Like, being pushed out of the key targets.
20 February 1942. Butterworth, Malaya.
allanpcameron
Donor
20 February 1942. Butterworth, Malaya.
The Generals pored over the maps trying to make sense of what the Japanese were up to. Lieutenant-General Ivor Mackay (GOC I Australian Corps), Major-General Morshead (GOC 9 Division), Major-General Cecil Callaghan (GOC 8 Division) and Major-General Beckwith-Smith (GOC 18th Infantry Division) were immensely proud of the two Australian and one British Divisions. The destruction of the Japanese army around Ipoh and Kuala Kangsar had been a desperate fight, and the butcher’s bill had been awful.
The mobility of 8 Division had allowed them to advance back up the road that the 11th Indian Division had retreated down. The lack of Japanese resistance had been something of a surprise. There had been small groups of Japanese at various river crossings and villages, but these hadn’t put up too much of a fight. The fact the Divisional Cavalry Regiment’s light tanks and other armoured vehicles were the vanguard of the advance, put the Japanese at a complete disadvantage. The tanks tended to blast through any resistance, with the infantry following up and securing the area.
The Muda River had been one of the main defensive lines and had been heavily fought over. The reconnaissance patrols had found the obvious crossing points and some less obvious places. There were obvious signs that the Japanese had some kind of reception waiting for the Australians. There were some aggressive patrols trying to get a clearer picture, but for Mackay something seemed odd. Part of the problem was that Intelligence had estimates of the size of the Japanese forces, but the reality on the ground was quite different.
One of 9 Division’s Brigades had followed the road from Taiping via Selama, and had found almost no traces of the Japanese except lots of destruction and a civilian population that had been severely maltreated. Just about every bit of food had been stolen and the Australians found that they were sharing much of their own rations with the locals. On the main road from Taiping, the same destruction, theft and maltreatment was even greater. There was obviously some kind of problem with the Japanese logistical tail, that their soldiers were living off the land.
Two Brigades of 18th Division had followed the trail up towards Grik, chasing the retiring Japanese all the way. Regular firefights erupted as the British would come across a rear-guard which would sell itself heavily to allow other units to escape. The presence of the Infantry Tanks made these encounters particularly costly for the Japanese, but getting the tanks through some pretty bad terrain hadn’t been easy. Supplying the two Brigades was particularly difficult, and so Beckwith-Smith had ordered them to stop at Grik until they were fully replenished.
The effect of all this information was that the Japanese seemed to have been trying to run their attack on a shoestring, and had somehow underestimated the British Empire’s forces that they were up against. Perhaps they believed that they’d be able to subsist off captured army supplies, but 11th Indian Division had been particularly careful to avoid letting anything fall into enemy hands.
The Australians had had to pause to allow their own supplies to catch up with them. Fuel for the tanks and lorries, food and ammunition for the men and guns were brought up in convoys, which often had some kind of aerial escort to prevent the Japanese air force from intercepting them. The days of having to run convoys at night to prevent enemy aircraft from attacking seemed to be behind the Australians.
Part of the good news was that Georgetown and Penang Island had been liberated. Soon coastal craft would be bringing supplies up by sea, taking strain off the roads and the badly damaged railway. Major-General Morshead was keen to keep up the pressure on the Japanese, not to allow them time to dig in and create another defensive position that would need to be reduced piece by piece. Callaghan agreed, but was aware that there wasn’t much behind them. One weakened Brigade of 18th Infantry Division were still in the vicinity of the recent battle around Ipoh. The III Indian Corps were back in Johore being reconstituted after their exertions at the beginning of the campaign.
Callaghan argued for a limited objective, to get to Gurun which had proven to be a good defensive position. The Australians could stop there until there was a strong enough force to push up into Thailand. He reminded the others that the objective of the counter-attack was to draw the Japanese forces away from Thailand, so that Slim’s thrust from Burma could get going. Beckwith-Smith was agreeable. He noted that his two effective Brigades could advance from Grik to Kroh, and once again plug the road over the centre of the country towards Patani. Morshead, however, was keen to keep up the pressure. It could be that be stopping at Gurun and Kroh, would simply give the Japanese time to recover. Once the supplies were coming forward in sufficient quantities, there was probably nothing to stop the Corps from reaching Jitra, even Signora in Thailand. 9 Division had travelled a lot further in North Africa, kicking the Italians all the way. It was entirely feasible to do the same to the Japanese.
Lieutenant-General Mackay was torn between the two arguments, his heart was with Morshead, but his head was telling him that the Japanese couldn’t possibly be as weak as it seemed. Getting too far ahead of support from the south of Malaya could well be a trap. He could find himself coming up against fresh Japanese troops just as his own men were at the end of their tether. Mackay would have to confer with Lieutenant-General Percival, and offer him the two alternatives.
The Generals pored over the maps trying to make sense of what the Japanese were up to. Lieutenant-General Ivor Mackay (GOC I Australian Corps), Major-General Morshead (GOC 9 Division), Major-General Cecil Callaghan (GOC 8 Division) and Major-General Beckwith-Smith (GOC 18th Infantry Division) were immensely proud of the two Australian and one British Divisions. The destruction of the Japanese army around Ipoh and Kuala Kangsar had been a desperate fight, and the butcher’s bill had been awful.
The mobility of 8 Division had allowed them to advance back up the road that the 11th Indian Division had retreated down. The lack of Japanese resistance had been something of a surprise. There had been small groups of Japanese at various river crossings and villages, but these hadn’t put up too much of a fight. The fact the Divisional Cavalry Regiment’s light tanks and other armoured vehicles were the vanguard of the advance, put the Japanese at a complete disadvantage. The tanks tended to blast through any resistance, with the infantry following up and securing the area.
The Muda River had been one of the main defensive lines and had been heavily fought over. The reconnaissance patrols had found the obvious crossing points and some less obvious places. There were obvious signs that the Japanese had some kind of reception waiting for the Australians. There were some aggressive patrols trying to get a clearer picture, but for Mackay something seemed odd. Part of the problem was that Intelligence had estimates of the size of the Japanese forces, but the reality on the ground was quite different.
One of 9 Division’s Brigades had followed the road from Taiping via Selama, and had found almost no traces of the Japanese except lots of destruction and a civilian population that had been severely maltreated. Just about every bit of food had been stolen and the Australians found that they were sharing much of their own rations with the locals. On the main road from Taiping, the same destruction, theft and maltreatment was even greater. There was obviously some kind of problem with the Japanese logistical tail, that their soldiers were living off the land.
Two Brigades of 18th Division had followed the trail up towards Grik, chasing the retiring Japanese all the way. Regular firefights erupted as the British would come across a rear-guard which would sell itself heavily to allow other units to escape. The presence of the Infantry Tanks made these encounters particularly costly for the Japanese, but getting the tanks through some pretty bad terrain hadn’t been easy. Supplying the two Brigades was particularly difficult, and so Beckwith-Smith had ordered them to stop at Grik until they were fully replenished.
The effect of all this information was that the Japanese seemed to have been trying to run their attack on a shoestring, and had somehow underestimated the British Empire’s forces that they were up against. Perhaps they believed that they’d be able to subsist off captured army supplies, but 11th Indian Division had been particularly careful to avoid letting anything fall into enemy hands.
The Australians had had to pause to allow their own supplies to catch up with them. Fuel for the tanks and lorries, food and ammunition for the men and guns were brought up in convoys, which often had some kind of aerial escort to prevent the Japanese air force from intercepting them. The days of having to run convoys at night to prevent enemy aircraft from attacking seemed to be behind the Australians.
Part of the good news was that Georgetown and Penang Island had been liberated. Soon coastal craft would be bringing supplies up by sea, taking strain off the roads and the badly damaged railway. Major-General Morshead was keen to keep up the pressure on the Japanese, not to allow them time to dig in and create another defensive position that would need to be reduced piece by piece. Callaghan agreed, but was aware that there wasn’t much behind them. One weakened Brigade of 18th Infantry Division were still in the vicinity of the recent battle around Ipoh. The III Indian Corps were back in Johore being reconstituted after their exertions at the beginning of the campaign.
Callaghan argued for a limited objective, to get to Gurun which had proven to be a good defensive position. The Australians could stop there until there was a strong enough force to push up into Thailand. He reminded the others that the objective of the counter-attack was to draw the Japanese forces away from Thailand, so that Slim’s thrust from Burma could get going. Beckwith-Smith was agreeable. He noted that his two effective Brigades could advance from Grik to Kroh, and once again plug the road over the centre of the country towards Patani. Morshead, however, was keen to keep up the pressure. It could be that be stopping at Gurun and Kroh, would simply give the Japanese time to recover. Once the supplies were coming forward in sufficient quantities, there was probably nothing to stop the Corps from reaching Jitra, even Signora in Thailand. 9 Division had travelled a lot further in North Africa, kicking the Italians all the way. It was entirely feasible to do the same to the Japanese.
Lieutenant-General Mackay was torn between the two arguments, his heart was with Morshead, but his head was telling him that the Japanese couldn’t possibly be as weak as it seemed. Getting too far ahead of support from the south of Malaya could well be a trap. He could find himself coming up against fresh Japanese troops just as his own men were at the end of their tether. Mackay would have to confer with Lieutenant-General Percival, and offer him the two alternatives.
He is dealing with Yamashita, a wily commander, who has trained with the Wehrmacht. I'd say slow the advance and see what develops, rather than a headlong rush to the north.
in the same position as they found themselves in Africa either go for it or stop dig in build up blunt the counter and go again
Percival is having nightmares about otl so he'll prob wait and have all forces built up plus he's leaving soo so he should end his tenure on a victory
I think they could advance for a while, since I feel like the Japanese decided to retreat and setting up heavy defences at Pattani and Hat Yai, where they were Japanese first started their advance into Malaya, while putting up some light resistance near the airstrips at Alor Setar, Gong Kedak, and Kota Bharu. If they really want to stop though, perhaps the area between Alor Setar and Jitra in particular would be suitable enough as a compromise between Morshead's more ambitious target(Singora would probably way too much for Percival,) and Callaghan's (Gurun) suggestion.
I would not be surprised if the Japanese were up to some extremely idiotic shenanigans though, like taking some members of the royal family of the northern states (heck, even perhaps the Thai royal family considering the situation right now) as hostages.
Edit: Totally forgot that the aerodrome is north of Alor Setar, not south (I blame the two Kepala Batas for this). In fact the aerodrome is halfway between Alor Setar and Jitra.
I would not be surprised if the Japanese were up to some extremely idiotic shenanigans though, like taking some members of the royal family of the northern states (heck, even perhaps the Thai royal family considering the situation right now) as hostages.
Edit: Totally forgot that the aerodrome is north of Alor Setar, not south (I blame the two Kepala Batas for this). In fact the aerodrome is halfway between Alor Setar and Jitra.
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Hmm I don’t think it's a bad idea to take a pause at Gurun and Kroh it gives them time to effect field repairs and resupply as well as gives the troops time to rest. Given the resistance and subsided charges the Japanese are fond of the Units engaged in this fighting nerves must be starting to fray.
We know that the IJA logistics are a total shit show and the reason they haven't seen many Japanese is they mostly stood, fought and died in the south. We also know that IJA reinforcements are coming and that the most likely scenario is a meeting engagement rather than the Empire forces walking into a trap. But we have far more information than these Generals would have and even more so they are going to be very susceptible to mirroring. To assume that the IJA works like the British Army and tries to feed it's men is only logical.
didn't the british also blow up like the only rail going south into Malaysia as well as blocked several roads ? that can't be helping supplies either
They are more than likely already are past that point the IJA depended heavily on capture supplies in its operations heck it was factored into their Plans OTL that they would capture enemy supplies to sustain them rather than depending on their own logistic system they built up. Heck OTL on Japanese bases over flights of US Aircraft found them having converted sections of their bases into farms because they couldn't depend on their own logistics train for food as example. They also looted a lot from local populations and not just food but I wouldn't be surprised if they are taking clothes and other necessities from local villages.
Ramp-Rat
Monthly Donor
Should the British take advantage of the collapse of the Japanese invasion of Malaya, and launch a major counterattack at this time? To which in my opinion the answer is definitely no, such a counterattack at this time would be a mistake. The situation bears a number of parallels with that that existed on the Indian Burmese border after the failure of the Japanese attempted invasion of India. Which was the largest defeat that the Japanese Army had suffered up until that time in WWII, and left the Japanese unable to resist the subsequent British counteroffensive. Which eventually resulted in the British forces recapturing the majority of Burma and its major sea port of Rangoon. However there are some major significant differences between the British in Malaya in 1942, and the British in Burma in 1944. In Burma in 44, the British enjoyed near air supremacy and air superiority at all times, were as ITTL, the British are still fighting an active aerial campaign at present. In Burma in 44, thanks to lessons learned, and by diverting aircraft from the Hump mission, provide air supply to their forward troops, along with aerial evacuation of their wounded. Such is not available ITTL at this time to the British, and its going to be 1943 before the British will develop such capabilities. Bill Slim was able to tell his armoured forces and the supply formations, just get to Rangoon and you will be able to dump your present equipment, and draw all new kit, that is better then what you have now. There is no way that is going to happen ITTL, the troops are going to have to make the best of what they have for the foreseeable future.
The British also face a major humanitarian problem, as they need to provide relief to the local population, that has been subjected to the depletion of the Japanese attempt to live of the land. They also need to repair the extensive damage to the local infrastructure, both to supply their own forces and the local population. Unlike the British in Burma in 44, who had an objective that had the capability of providing a major re supply port. The British ITTL, would be advancing into territory that had no supplies or resources, and no substantial point of supply. With the fact that the local monsoon is due to arrive shortly, it will be best for the British to consolidate their position, and prepare for a campaign after the monsoon is over. While dealing with the ongoing campaign in and around Borneo and the DEI’s, which will no doubt be hotting up shortly. Add to this the Americans will be placing increasing pressure on the British to provide support and relief to their forces in the Philippines. The combination of ongoing events in Burma and Malaya, plus those in and around Borneo and the DEI’s, plus Britain’s commitments in the Mediterranean, Europe, Atlantic and Caribbean, mean that right now it would be best to put all future projects on hold. Especially in the Far East, where a significant pause in operations until the end of the upcoming monsoon. Which will allow the Army to exchange the present front line units which are in need of relief for units that have been in reserve. And for the British to prioritise its efforts in other areas, until they have more resources to spare for the conflict in the Far East, and the majority of the personnel will come from British India, as they did IOTL for the Burma campaign.
RR.
The British also face a major humanitarian problem, as they need to provide relief to the local population, that has been subjected to the depletion of the Japanese attempt to live of the land. They also need to repair the extensive damage to the local infrastructure, both to supply their own forces and the local population. Unlike the British in Burma in 44, who had an objective that had the capability of providing a major re supply port. The British ITTL, would be advancing into territory that had no supplies or resources, and no substantial point of supply. With the fact that the local monsoon is due to arrive shortly, it will be best for the British to consolidate their position, and prepare for a campaign after the monsoon is over. While dealing with the ongoing campaign in and around Borneo and the DEI’s, which will no doubt be hotting up shortly. Add to this the Americans will be placing increasing pressure on the British to provide support and relief to their forces in the Philippines. The combination of ongoing events in Burma and Malaya, plus those in and around Borneo and the DEI’s, plus Britain’s commitments in the Mediterranean, Europe, Atlantic and Caribbean, mean that right now it would be best to put all future projects on hold. Especially in the Far East, where a significant pause in operations until the end of the upcoming monsoon. Which will allow the Army to exchange the present front line units which are in need of relief for units that have been in reserve. And for the British to prioritise its efforts in other areas, until they have more resources to spare for the conflict in the Far East, and the majority of the personnel will come from British India, as they did IOTL for the Burma campaign.
RR.
The British should consolidate, reinforce and resupply for an offensive once the monsoon ends. Improving their defences during this time should also be a priority. This has the additional benefit of the Japanese even further alienating the Thais during the monsoon. Their airlift capability won't be sufficient to bring forward enough supplies, nor will their merchant fleet, considering the other demands laid upon both. Note that this doesn't even consider losses to storms, typhoons, RN & KM submarines, etc., etc. This will result in increased 'requisitions' from their Thai 'allies', in other words straight up looting of a population the Japanese consider inferior. There will be resistance, which will result in atrocities, which will have consequences up to and including a coup d'etat against the pro-Japanese government.
Ideally, by the time the Imperial & Commonwealth armies begin their offensive, the local population will probably welcome them as liberators and their advance eased by open combat between Japanese & Thai forces as Thailand beats Italy to be the first Axis ally to switch sides.
Ideally, by the time the Imperial & Commonwealth armies begin their offensive, the local population will probably welcome them as liberators and their advance eased by open combat between Japanese & Thai forces as Thailand beats Italy to be the first Axis ally to switch sides.
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Adding to what Salamander said, I imagine sickness amongst the Japanese Forces will increase as well throughout the Monsoon season as well due to the combination of lack of food and the possibility of the local population fouling the food. As the possibility for both sides to lose fortified positions to a particularly nasty storm it going to be a mess/