Think you are overstating the issues, supply problems cuts both ways. If Rangoon is in British hands they can supply a lot by sea and cut the supply in the East. If Singapore is holding then the Japanese supply losses by sea will be very heavy (subs with working torpedoes based near and only two ports really to interdict, Japanese ASW is poor, think drumbeat levels). Japan just does not have the transports to lose and land supply is basically one railway line.
Sir John Valentine Carden Survives. Part 2.
- Thread starter allanpcameron
- Start date
I think that's already been done in this TL with a troop of early Valiants being taken to France without authorisation 😁
20 January 1942. Ipoh. Malaya.
allanpcameron
Donor
20 January 1942. Ipoh. Malaya.
Lt-General Heath visited Major-General Murray-Lyon’s HQ to get an up to date report. The news about the fighting around Kuala Kangsar was generally good. The initial Japanese movements had been resisted and it was believed that the Japanese had taken heavy casualties. Murray-Lyon’s chief Intelligence officer showed Heath on a map the three-pronged attack that was forming. Thankfully the Japanese hadn’t been able to coordinate their efforts so far, allowing the Royal Artillery to focus entirely on the central attack. The Intelligence officer pointed out how the work of Skinner’s Horse in slowing the southern movement, and the HLI slowing the northern thrust, had been crucial.
While Murray-Lyon noted that the Japanese were going all out to defeat 11th Indian Division, Heath shared the worrying news that another attack was building against 9th Indian Division at Kuala Krai. Heath had almost nothing left in the locker as reserves except 29th Indian Brigade, which was in the process of resting and recuperating from their efforts at the Muda River.
The two generals spent some time with their staff to sort out clear instructions about what conditions would lead to 11th Division’s withdrawal, so that it could be done in an orderly fashion. Heath who’d toured the positions around the Perak River were congratulated 11th Division’s Commander Royal Engineers, they were among the best defensive positions available in the north of the country. Murray-Lyon expressed his fear that there were real dangers of being outflanked, especially to his south. The advantage that 11th Division had was that even if the Japanese were able to cross the Perak, the main railway and road ran behind another ridge of hills, giving his line of communication some protection.
Murray-Lyon’s men had taken the brunt of the Japanese attack, he really wanted to know Lt-Generals Percival and Mackay was when the Australian Corps would be ready to either take over the defence of Malaya or indeed, go on the attack?
Heath told him he’d been asking the same question. The latest update was that the Australian Corps’ level exercise had been completed. There were a lot of lessons that had to be learned, and quite a few problems that needed to be ironed out. Generally, the news was good, 18th Infantry Division were fully fit, and pretty well acclimatised, the two Australian Divisions were keen to get involved. Heath then shared Percival’s worry that if the Australian Corps moved north from Johor to Perak it could leave a gap for another amphibious landing nearer Singapore. Murray-Lyon expressed surprise, he’d been told that Singapore Island was now more defensively prepared for an attack, surely, he asked, delaying putting the Australian Corps into the fight could prove disastrous?
Heath knew that Lt-General Mackay had been having that debate with Percival too, and the timing of a counter-offensive was as important as where it happened and by whom. The reality was that when Australian Corps did go on the offensive, it was likely that Heath’s III Indian Corps would take over the Australian positions in Johore to rest and reorganise. If there was another Japanese landing, it would themselves who’s have to face it again. General Auchinleck was keen on having the Australians and Slim’s Burma forces to attack simultaneously. If that could be organised, then the Japanese would find themselves in real trouble.
What was important for now, was for 11th Division to hold the Japanese and bleed them as much as possible. The weaker the Japanese were, the easier for the Australians when the attack went in. Murray-Lyon couldn’t help think of his own men who’d been in almost constant battle since 8 December. Their morale was still good, they’d done well against an enemy who had surprised the senior officers’ who’d written the Japanese troops off for racial reasons.
Lt-General Heath left Murray-Lyon’s HQ satisfied that the situation, while threatening, was still in hand. The chances of 11th Indian Division collapsing were remote. There was always the possibility of being outflanked, but Heath was confident that Murray-Lyon wouldn’t abandon his very good position unless it was absolutely necessary. The next problem was getting over to Arthur Barstow’s HQ. 9th Indian Division’s GOC had already been sending out worrying messages about Japanese intentions. Once more Heath, having to move from one side of the country to the other, by going far enough south to be able to travel north again, made him fret about the two Divisions in his Corps being unable to support one another.
Lt-General Heath visited Major-General Murray-Lyon’s HQ to get an up to date report. The news about the fighting around Kuala Kangsar was generally good. The initial Japanese movements had been resisted and it was believed that the Japanese had taken heavy casualties. Murray-Lyon’s chief Intelligence officer showed Heath on a map the three-pronged attack that was forming. Thankfully the Japanese hadn’t been able to coordinate their efforts so far, allowing the Royal Artillery to focus entirely on the central attack. The Intelligence officer pointed out how the work of Skinner’s Horse in slowing the southern movement, and the HLI slowing the northern thrust, had been crucial.
While Murray-Lyon noted that the Japanese were going all out to defeat 11th Indian Division, Heath shared the worrying news that another attack was building against 9th Indian Division at Kuala Krai. Heath had almost nothing left in the locker as reserves except 29th Indian Brigade, which was in the process of resting and recuperating from their efforts at the Muda River.
The two generals spent some time with their staff to sort out clear instructions about what conditions would lead to 11th Division’s withdrawal, so that it could be done in an orderly fashion. Heath who’d toured the positions around the Perak River were congratulated 11th Division’s Commander Royal Engineers, they were among the best defensive positions available in the north of the country. Murray-Lyon expressed his fear that there were real dangers of being outflanked, especially to his south. The advantage that 11th Division had was that even if the Japanese were able to cross the Perak, the main railway and road ran behind another ridge of hills, giving his line of communication some protection.
Murray-Lyon’s men had taken the brunt of the Japanese attack, he really wanted to know Lt-Generals Percival and Mackay was when the Australian Corps would be ready to either take over the defence of Malaya or indeed, go on the attack?
Heath told him he’d been asking the same question. The latest update was that the Australian Corps’ level exercise had been completed. There were a lot of lessons that had to be learned, and quite a few problems that needed to be ironed out. Generally, the news was good, 18th Infantry Division were fully fit, and pretty well acclimatised, the two Australian Divisions were keen to get involved. Heath then shared Percival’s worry that if the Australian Corps moved north from Johor to Perak it could leave a gap for another amphibious landing nearer Singapore. Murray-Lyon expressed surprise, he’d been told that Singapore Island was now more defensively prepared for an attack, surely, he asked, delaying putting the Australian Corps into the fight could prove disastrous?
Heath knew that Lt-General Mackay had been having that debate with Percival too, and the timing of a counter-offensive was as important as where it happened and by whom. The reality was that when Australian Corps did go on the offensive, it was likely that Heath’s III Indian Corps would take over the Australian positions in Johore to rest and reorganise. If there was another Japanese landing, it would themselves who’s have to face it again. General Auchinleck was keen on having the Australians and Slim’s Burma forces to attack simultaneously. If that could be organised, then the Japanese would find themselves in real trouble.
What was important for now, was for 11th Division to hold the Japanese and bleed them as much as possible. The weaker the Japanese were, the easier for the Australians when the attack went in. Murray-Lyon couldn’t help think of his own men who’d been in almost constant battle since 8 December. Their morale was still good, they’d done well against an enemy who had surprised the senior officers’ who’d written the Japanese troops off for racial reasons.
Lt-General Heath left Murray-Lyon’s HQ satisfied that the situation, while threatening, was still in hand. The chances of 11th Indian Division collapsing were remote. There was always the possibility of being outflanked, but Heath was confident that Murray-Lyon wouldn’t abandon his very good position unless it was absolutely necessary. The next problem was getting over to Arthur Barstow’s HQ. 9th Indian Division’s GOC had already been sending out worrying messages about Japanese intentions. Once more Heath, having to move from one side of the country to the other, by going far enough south to be able to travel north again, made him fret about the two Divisions in his Corps being unable to support one another.
Auchinleck will sack him first and take over himself, just like he did in North Africa when he saved Egypt at first El Alamein.
That be Somme on the Muda (and remember no current politics outside pol chat)
Well, with the amount of the casualties mounting on that area, I would not be surprised ITTL, the narrow valley at the road between Taiping and Kuala Kangsar, specifically between Bukit Gantang (hill of bushel in Malay) and Padang Rengas (which its' name meant in Malay, a field full of Rengas trees.), will get the name Lembah (or Laluan (road/path)) Maut/Mati (valley of death) .
Err, the Muda river is probably not relevant or related to the place where the significant amount of the casualties are happening right now. Did you meant the Perak river?
By this point, the Muda river is the equivalent of La Bresle for the Japanese by this point, parallel wise.
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Well let's hope he is on top of thing and not letting Percival Percy things up!
Rommel Enjoyed an excellent OpSec advantage in his radio Interception unit was top class providing near real time intel on British units and the US State Dept Black code having been cracked and it telling the Axis everything they needed to know.
I doubt very much that the Japanese enjoy the same Tactical and Strategic advantages
Ramp-Rat
Monthly Donor
On the question of the Japanese and coded messages, the Japanese like the Germans suffered from a problem. Where the Germans believed that their codes were so sophisticated that they were unbreakable, the Japanese believed that their language was so different and complex that no European would be able to understand it, and thus their codes were unbreakable. This form of national arrogance was as with the Germans, very much their downfall, and by the end of the war vitally all of their codes had been broken. This was helped by a major advantage that the Allies had over the Axis, especially the Anglo Americans, they were prepared to cooperate. It should be noted that Anglo American cooperation across the boards was extensive during WWII, from British scientists working alongside their American and European refugee compatriots on the Atomic bomb project, through numerous technical studies, and a general sharing of intelligence information. With regard to signals intelligence, there were shared signals intercepted sites, and a devision of tasks. The British took the lead on German Enigma. while the Americans concentrated on the Japanese Purple, and the various manual codes were similarly divided, between British and American teams.
The Japanese Army has a number of problems, first it was as I have said before, generally inward looking in comparison to the Japanese Navy. And it placed little internal enfaces on its intelligence services. Being an intelligence officer was in comparison to being a combat officer somewhat dishonourable, nor culturally were they well regarded, as in Japan to disagree with ones superior wasn’t exactly the done thing. In addition up until now the Japanese Army had very little use for an extensive, well trained and equipped signals intercept service, unlike the Navy. They have been fighting the Chinese, who themselves had very little use of Radio/Wireless, and so there was no need to establish a broad interception capability. Whereas the Germans who expected to use Radio/Wireless extensively and expected their opponents to do likewise, did pre war establish such a service. Nor do the Japanese have the large pool of young radio hams, who can speak English, whereas the British and Americans do have such an extensive pool of young men proficient in basic radio/wireless communications. They just need to train them in basic Japanese language skills, or in the case of the Americans use their own Japanese-Americans.
The ability of the Japanese Army to intercept British radio and wireless signals is in comparison to the ability of the Germans to do the same is basic. While their capabilities to break the British codes, is equally basic, given that they haven’t been trying to do so for years, as is the case with the Germans. In addition while the can to an extent intercept voice radio, they have the problem that even their best linguists are going to struggle with some regional accents, and they will have few who understand the various Indian languages. Add to this the British, just like the Americans are not reliant on wireless for their high level communications, having an extensive landline and cable network. High level messages from London to Singapore can be sent over the imperial cable network, and from Singapore to the front lines, on the existing landline system in Malaya. While the Japanese will gain some tactical information from signals interception, they are not going to gain very much strategic information from signals interception. Note towards the end of the war IOTL, the British sent midget submarines to cut the undersea cables between various locations in the Far East, to force the Japanese to switch to wireless communication. Which the British were able to intercept and decipher, I don’t see the Japanese being able to mount such an operation, or having the ability to decipher the British codes.
RR.
The Japanese Army has a number of problems, first it was as I have said before, generally inward looking in comparison to the Japanese Navy. And it placed little internal enfaces on its intelligence services. Being an intelligence officer was in comparison to being a combat officer somewhat dishonourable, nor culturally were they well regarded, as in Japan to disagree with ones superior wasn’t exactly the done thing. In addition up until now the Japanese Army had very little use for an extensive, well trained and equipped signals intercept service, unlike the Navy. They have been fighting the Chinese, who themselves had very little use of Radio/Wireless, and so there was no need to establish a broad interception capability. Whereas the Germans who expected to use Radio/Wireless extensively and expected their opponents to do likewise, did pre war establish such a service. Nor do the Japanese have the large pool of young radio hams, who can speak English, whereas the British and Americans do have such an extensive pool of young men proficient in basic radio/wireless communications. They just need to train them in basic Japanese language skills, or in the case of the Americans use their own Japanese-Americans.
The ability of the Japanese Army to intercept British radio and wireless signals is in comparison to the ability of the Germans to do the same is basic. While their capabilities to break the British codes, is equally basic, given that they haven’t been trying to do so for years, as is the case with the Germans. In addition while the can to an extent intercept voice radio, they have the problem that even their best linguists are going to struggle with some regional accents, and they will have few who understand the various Indian languages. Add to this the British, just like the Americans are not reliant on wireless for their high level communications, having an extensive landline and cable network. High level messages from London to Singapore can be sent over the imperial cable network, and from Singapore to the front lines, on the existing landline system in Malaya. While the Japanese will gain some tactical information from signals interception, they are not going to gain very much strategic information from signals interception. Note towards the end of the war IOTL, the British sent midget submarines to cut the undersea cables between various locations in the Far East, to force the Japanese to switch to wireless communication. Which the British were able to intercept and decipher, I don’t see the Japanese being able to mount such an operation, or having the ability to decipher the British codes.
RR.
And Rommel still lost, badly. He never recovered from First El Alamien and his later attempt to break through the British defences at Alam el Halfa (though Monty was in charge then).
The most important part of El Alamein is rarely mentioned in most histories. It was the capture of Rommel's SIGINT unit by 9 Division AIF at Tel al Arisa when they decided to go for a swim in the sea. Without that unit, Rommel was essentially blind and it showed all the way to Tunisia. It was the unit that decrypted the "Black Code" that the Italians had stolen in Rome before the Americans entered the war and which routinely told him exactly where and what the strengths of 8th Army was and how he was able to counter and defeat that unit, time after time, in battle after battle. Rommel was no tactical genius, he was just a well informed one.
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Sounds like the Malaya campaign might end up with the Japanese army cut off and surrounded. I'd expect them to fight even more ferociously when cornered though, what has been happening to Malayan citizens? How are the relations between the various ethnic groups of the peninsula and the soldiers from various parts of the British Empire?
When I was at bletchley park I picked up a book called 'The Emperors Codes' which talked about the British attempt to crack the IJAs and IJNs codes as well as a small section of the museums dedicated to it.
One issue the British ran into was a lack of people in the SIGINT section who could speak and read Japanese which hampered the ability to read them.
The British should have got their own back and used some of the weirder Brisihish dialects still spoken in the 1940's but now sadly fading as a basis for codes. My great Uncle worked in Sigint during the war and was fluent in the Westmorland dialect which as far as I can gather was a mix of Galeic, Welsh and complete nonsense!
Had a great great uncle who was part of the Scots Guards a bloody bear of a man for the time to old for WW2 except for anything but training and to young for WW1.
But man was a fluent Galeic speaker wouldn't be surprised if he worked in areas in the war for training or code talking because I imagine that anyone who could speak Galeic in japan would be non existent.
Unfortunately the British would need people who understood this on both ends 😁