IJN Soryu's and USS Wasp's Durability and Usefulness

Coming back to the main post; Both Soryu and USS Wasp were comparable in size, capabilities (except speed), strength and weaknesses. So in both cases all would depend on how their respective crews would react on and fight against damage in combat.

In this case the 2nd part of 1942, the USN had made several gains in both training and capabilities with dealing battle damage. The IJN did not treat such a thing at the same level, though had learned about a few things as well by this period in the war (Guadalcanal campaign showed an improved resistance to battle damage on other CV's in the IJN so Soryu would likely have made the same improvements.) Also note the majority of damage dealt by USN aircraft was with divebombers, partly due to the switch from the obsolete TBD to the more advanged TBF, partly due to the still horrible quality of USN torpedoes at this time. Japanese airgroups normally had a more ballanced strike with equal numbers of divebombers and torpedobombers, often coordinating their attacks, where USN practice at the time was still a fragmented attack with every CV doing its own thing with little or no cooperation.

Given the differences I would suppose both USS Wasp and Soryu to be about equal in terms of just the ship itself, but tend to give the IJN a small advantage in air operations, partly due to combat experience, partly due to operational doctrine. So in terms of a direct slug out between the two, I would give Soryu's airgroup the benefit of the doubt in doing the first damage, which USS Wasp still might survive, as the ship itself would have been prepared for battle and trimmed correctly as trained for. USS Wasp's airgroup was relatively untested and not well equipped at the time, with no torpedobombers trained for being operated from this ship, as the ship lacked this type of aircraft originally and even had no magazines internally for torpedoes. The complement of TBF's just were shipped in prior to her OTL last mission, with no torpedoes, meaning these aircraft would use bombs as primary weapons. So the heaviest ship killing potential was for the Japanese in this phase of the war.

Basically all would depend on how damage was countered and how the ship's internal flaw's would play up. In this case USS Wasp was the tougher design, based on the equally designed larger Yorktown, where the narrow hulled Soryu had some designed flaws in her when build, like all IJN CV's at the time. These were primarily in the aviation fuel bunkers and pipelines internally, as well as a protocol in how aircraft operations were conducted, namely arming and fueling in the hangars, where the USN normally did this on the flightdeck. The USS Wasp was therefor in the advantage in this item, though when taking damage from large warheads, like torpedoes the difference as about nullified, as both were seriously vulnerable to shockdamage and had a tendency to loose power when hit by underwater explosions. (Something USS Wasp could not deal out, missing torpedoes for her aircraft in august 1942. )
Huh. I knew that Wasp was not originally designed for a TB squadron, but I didn't know she was reliant just on bombs for her Avengers. That cuts down her offensive power significantly (although makes her better for land support).

Wasp does have a larger aigroup (about 70 compared to 63) so can last longer in a theatre, potentially - assuming no damage and an escort force.
 
Um - @McPherson , @HMS Warspite , @I want to learn , @CV12Hornet , this is quite a long way from the OP. By all means have this discussion if you want though.

Meanwhile, bulging Wasp has been mentioned - which is something I've never heard of before, and which is probably a good idea. But how much speed would be lost? She was already quite slow anyway and losing 2 or 3 more knots might relegate her to serving with the battleships as some sort of fighter carrier.
Maybe no speed at all - some bulgings, the ones on the R-class and the American coal-burners, cost no speed at all due to hydrodynamic refinements compensating for the bluffer hull.
Given the differences I would suppose both USS Wasp and Soryu to be about equal in terms of just the ship itself, but tend to give the IJN a small advantage in air operations, partly due to combat experience, partly due to operational doctrine. So in terms of a direct slug out between the two, I would give Soryu's airgroup the benefit of the doubt in doing the first damage, which USS Wasp still might survive, as the ship itself would have been prepared for battle and trimmed correctly as trained for. USS Wasp's airgroup was relatively untested and not well equipped at the time, with no torpedobombers trained for being operated from this ship, as the ship lacked this type of aircraft originally and even had no magazines internally for torpedoes. The complement of TBF's just were shipped in prior to her OTL last mission, with no torpedoes, meaning these aircraft would use bombs as primary weapons. So the heaviest ship killing potential was for the Japanese in this phase of the war.
This is completely incorrect. Ranger was the carrier not designed for torpedo bombers. Wasp had them in December 1941, and she had them in March 1942 before she went on that Club Run to Malta. And no, the TBFs were not shipped in prior to her last mission, unless you count the entire Guadalcanal campaign her "last mission".

That her torpedo bombers were not used to actually launch torpedoes comes down to a lack of opportunity, not capability.
 
Maybe no speed at all - some bulgings, the ones on the R-class and the American coal-burners, cost no speed at all due to hydrodynamic refinements compensating for the bluffer hull.

This is completely incorrect. Ranger was the carrier not designed for torpedo bombers. Wasp had them in December 1941, and she had them in March 1942 before she went on that Club Run to Malta. And no, the TBFs were not shipped in prior to her last mission, unless you count the entire Guadalcanal campaign her "last mission".

That her torpedo bombers were not used to actually launch torpedoes comes down to a lack of opportunity, not capability.
There is a difference in being equipped for torpedoplanes, and carrying TBD's, or TBF's. Just having the planes is not the same as capable of launching them with torpedoes as ordonance. To have these, your ship must have a dedicated magazine to store torpedoes in the first place, which was absent on USS Wasp CV-7. At first in december 1941, a wing of TBD-1's was carried, soon to be put ashore due to lack of space as the ship was to perform in other duties in Europe and North Atlantic. In june 1942 the TBD-1 was replaced by the new TBF, when the ship was reassigned for the Guadalcanal campaign, where she did not return from, so it is correct to mention the TBF's were assigned to USS Wasp on her final mission (meaning being send to the SW Pacific.)
 
There is a difference in being equipped for torpedoplanes, and carrying TBD's, or TBF's. Just having the planes is not the same as capable of launching them with torpedoes as ordonance. To have these, your ship must have a dedicated magazine to store torpedoes in the first place, which was absent on USS Wasp CV-7. At first in december 1941, a wing of TBD-1's was carried, soon to be put ashore due to lack of space as the ship was to perform in other duties in Europe and North Atlantic. In june 1942 the TBD-1 was replaced by the new TBF, when the ship was reassigned for the Guadalcanal campaign, where she did not return from, so it is correct to mention the TBF's were assigned to USS Wasp on her final mission (meaning being send to the SW Pacific.)
They were carrying those same torpedo planes in March before the Club Run.

As for her not having torpedo stowage: prove it.
 
There is a difference in being equipped for torpedoplanes, and carrying TBD's, or TBF's. Just having the planes is not the same as capable of launching them with torpedoes as ordonance. To have these, your ship must have a dedicated magazine to store torpedoes in the first place, which was absent on USS Wasp CV-7. At first in december 1941, a wing of TBD-1's was carried, soon to be put ashore due to lack of space as the ship was to perform in other duties in Europe and North Atlantic. In june 1942 the TBD-1 was replaced by the new TBF, when the ship was reassigned for the Guadalcanal campaign, where she did not return from, so it is correct to mention the TBF's were assigned to USS Wasp on her final mission (meaning being send to the SW Pacific.)
I've got to agree with @CV12Hornet here. I think you're confusing Wasp (CV-7) with Ranger (CV-4). Either that or your confusing the lack of torpedo defenses with the lack of a torpedo magazine. While Wasp didn't have a TDS, she very much had a torpedoe magazine and was operating torpedo bombers from at least June, 1942 when she loaded the rest of her Air Group after transferring from the Atlantic Fleet to the Pacific.
 
Removing the torpedo stowage was considered as a weight-saving measure during the design process, as I recently discovered. But Admiral King intervened and got it put back in. That's the closest thing to any sort of confirmation I've found one way or another on her torpedo stowage.
 
Yup, that's torpedo stowage. I must have missed that in my first look at the plans.

Welp, that settles that.
 
According to Nihon Kaigun: http://www.combinedfleet.com/soryu.htm

- 1025-1026 While continuing launch preparations against a sighted enemy carrier, attacked by thirteen enemy dive bombers. Two direct bomb hits are sustained, one on the forward elevator, the other aft the second elevator, setting off furious fires and induced explosions among the armed and fueled aircraft.
- 1029 A 1,000 pound bomb hit amidships abreast the stacks, the bomb or its blast effects apparently penetrating to explode on the lower hangar deck starting fires amid the aircraft returned from the Midway strike. The explosion also damaged the upper section of the boiler rooms and shattered steam lines. With the main supply line shattered, steam to drive the turbines escaped. SORYU's engines abruptly ceased and she lost all propulsion on both sides. Plane-guard destroyer ISOKAZE near-missed off fantail.

This seems to indicate that the engines were taken out by a direct hit. You are right though that she took 3 bomb hits.

That was a 1,000-pound weapon, though. Makes me wonder: if Soryu only took that bomb hit with no refuelling or rearming airplanes on board, how would she be salvaged? The damage does not seem to be fatal in of itself, and only involves loss of propulsion. I think power to the weapons should be around. Towing her, perhaps?

The thing is, IJN doctrine was to arm torpedo bombers in the hangar bay and dive bombers on the flight deck. So if Yorktown's bombers are a few minutes late and Soryu, having fuelled her Vals, has them on deck when they appear, could she survive?
Regarding Midway in general, Shattered Sword by Parshall and Tully is really a must read.

Soryu was built extremely lightly and was hit extremely hard. The three bombs were placed nearly perfectly, destroying both hanger deck, destroying elevator operations, wrecking the propulsion systems and killing a LOT of crew. Worse, it would appear that they ruptured aviation fuel tanks, meaning that even if there wasnt ordinance scattered around, she is burning horribly.

From the circumstances around Midway, she is unlikely to survive any of those hits.

--
If, however, the hits take place near Japan, away from enemy forces and with towing assets near (this is of course a thought excersise) and with her planes mostly off the ship or on deck, it could be that she is towed to port.

In this case, expect extreme crew casualties along with the need to essentially rebuild the ship. She'll need nee boilers, a redone powerplant and a new crew. Given the hanger "box" that the IJN used (really the worst of both the Smerican and British designs) the intense and prolonged heat may have warped her hull form, necessitating a removal and replacement of entire hull sections.

Finally, all the slag metal inside will need to be removed, along with the hanger decks themselves.

In short, if we bend space and time to get her into port, the entire inside will need to be replaced, much of the hull will need replaced, her crew probably needs 80%+ replacement after increased casualties from fighting fires, and it's possible that her superstructure collapses, needing removal and replacement.

Usually when people say "not worth repairs" it's done a little early. However, in this sake you are looking st replacing over half the displacement in order to get a still somewhat warped ship back in service.
 
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Nice drawings, I agree with you this is what I had been overlooking due to lack of this drawing. I stand corrected and thx for the details.
 
Regarding Midway in general, Shattered Sword by Parshall and Tully is really a must read.

Soryu was built extremely lightly and was hit extremely hard. The three bombs were placed nearly perfectly, destroying both hanger deck, destroying elevator operations, wrecking the propulsion systems and killing a LOT of crew. Worse, it would appear that they ruptured aviation fuel tanks, meaning that even if there wasnt ordinance scattered around, she is burning horribly.

From the circumstances around Midway, she is unlikely to survive any of those hits.

--
If, however, the hits take place near Japan, away from enemy forces and with towing assets near (this is of course a thought excersise) and with her planes mostly off the ship or on deck, it could be that she is towed to port.

In this case, expect extreme crew casualties along with the need to essentially rebuild the ship. She'll need nee boilers, a redone powerplant and a new crew. Given the hanger "box" that the IJN used (really the worst of both the Smerican and British designs) the intense and prolonged heat may have warped her hull form, necessitating a removal and replacement of entire hull sections.

Finally, all the slag metal inside will need to be removed, along with the hanger decks themselves.

In short, if we bend space and time to get her into port, the entire inside will need to be replaced, much of the hull will need replaced, her crew probably needs 80%+ replacement after increased casualties from fighting fires, and it's possible that her superstructure collapses, needing removal and replacement.

Usually when people say "not worth repairs" it's done a little early. However, in this sake you are looking st replacing over half the displacement in order to get a still somewhat warped ship back in service.
That was exactly Nagumo's reason why he ordered the scuttling of his stricken CV's. The option of towing back stricken hulks across the Pacific was not a very tempting option, so to get rid of the stricken hulks was the best option, primarily as the towing would be at a creepingly slow pace, taking months at least before getting back in Japan, besides acting as a magnet for enemy attacks, as Nagumo by now must have realized the USN was still capable of striking him with aircraft, while he could do nothing in return.

Secondly the inflicted damage was such a heavy one, even if returning the stricken hulks back to japan, rebuilding the CV's on the damaged ships was a seriously challanging project to say the least. (Building a new ship from scratch would have been easier.) Basically the ships were burnt up above the waterline and internally completely destroyed. This left just the bare hulls as a base, with not much else in terms of engines, boilers and other internal systems. (Except Kaga which was holed by a large internal explosion, possibly her bombstoremagazine, and going down even without scuttling. Akagi, Soryu and Hiryu were scuttled by putting a few torpedoes in them, which holed their hulls to flood them. Note in this time USN torpedoes were still horribly unreliable as the failed scuttling of USS Hornet would show a few months later.)

Something technical: The box system of hangars on their own are not the main cause of making a design more vulnerable to damage, as the system did work fine in other nation's carriers of similar layout. It was the nature of AVGAS pipelines and other fuel related systems that were the primary reason of the IJN CV's being such fire hazards. British CV's build as such all had armored box style internal layout for hangar and ship sides, which worked pretty well, especially with the armored flight deck in Illustrious class and succeeding ships. Unlike Japanese CV's the British used CO2 gas to fill their pipelines when the ship was under attack, preventing such horrors as the Japanese would suffer time and time again. USN CV's too did this in most cases, unless hit by surprise in some cases. (Like USS Wasp, USS Princeton, USS Bunker Hill and USS Franklin to name a few.) The biggest advantage of the internal armored box style hangar to the open superstructure style, mostly used on USN CV's and a few Japanese, is the strength offered by such a system when taking direct damage from weapons, where lightly build superstructure style hangar's and flightdeck are more prone to crippling damage to force the ship out of the combat, being incapable of further operations, as the hangar, or flightdeck is incapacitated an unable to be repaired at sea. (Even nature can cause this sort of damage btw.) The best examples were proven when the Kamikaze attacks were done on both USN and Royal Navy carriers, with USN Carriers being forced back home to repair their gutted flightdecks, while the tough British CV's were barely scratched.
 
Maybe no speed at all - some bulgings, the ones on the R-class and the American coal-burners, cost no speed at all due to hydrodynamic refinements compensating for the bluffer hull.
Good to know about the bulges. Wasp still has nearly no deck armour though - just 1.25 inches over the steering gear. A 550lb bomb should punch through her. Being small, she won't be able to absorb the damage as much and will suffer.
 
That was exactly Nagumo's reason why he ordered the scuttling of his stricken CV's. The option of towing back stricken hulks across the Pacific was not a very tempting option, so to get rid of the stricken hulks was the best option, primarily as the towing would be at a creepingly slow pace, taking months at least before getting back in Japan, besides acting as a magnet for enemy attacks, as Nagumo by now must have realized the USN was still capable of striking him with aircraft, while he could do nothing in return.

Secondly the inflicted damage was such a heavy one, even if returning the stricken hulks back to japan, rebuilding the CV's on the damaged ships was a seriously challanging project to say the least. (Building a new ship from scratch would have been easier.) Basically the ships were burnt up above the waterline and internally completely destroyed. This left just the bare hulls as a base, with not much else in terms of engines, boilers and other internal systems. (Except Kaga which was holed by a large internal explosion, possibly her bombstoremagazine, and going down even without scuttling. Akagi, Soryu and Hiryu were scuttled by putting a few torpedoes in them, which holed their hulls to flood them. Note in this time USN torpedoes were still horribly unreliable as the failed scuttling of USS Hornet would show a few months later.)

Something technical: The box system of hangars on their own are not the main cause of making a design more vulnerable to damage, as the system did work fine in other nation's carriers of similar layout. It was the nature of AVGAS pipelines and other fuel related systems that were the primary reason of the IJN CV's being such fire hazards. British CV's build as such all had armored box style internal layout for hangar and ship sides, which worked pretty well, especially with the armored flight deck in Illustrious class and succeeding ships. Unlike Japanese CV's the British used CO2 gas to fill their pipelines when the ship was under attack, preventing such horrors as the Japanese would suffer time and time again. USN CV's too did this in most cases, unless hit by surprise in some cases. (Like USS Wasp, USS Princeton, USS Bunker Hill and USS Franklin to name a few.) The biggest advantage of the internal armored box style hangar to the open superstructure style, mostly used on USN CV's and a few Japanese, is the strength offered by such a system when taking direct damage from weapons, where lightly build superstructure style hangar's and flightdeck are more prone to crippling damage to force the ship out of the combat, being incapable of further operations, as the hangar, or flightdeck is incapacitated an unable to be repaired at sea. (Even nature can cause this sort of damage btw.) The best examples were proven when the Kamikaze attacks were done on both USN and Royal Navy carriers, with USN Carriers being forced back home to repair their gutted flightdecks, while the tough British CV's were barely scratched.
So basically, @HMS Warspite and @Pete55 , if Soryu is hit by anything big in a combat environment, she is doomed.

However...
1614428248725.png


As shown at Midway, she can do impressive donuts (this is her dodging a B-17 attack). I think that is her biggest strength and the way to survive: don't get hit.

Makes me wonder: if Soryu operates with bigger and more visible carriers, or even battleships, perhaps as a fighter carrier given their smaller size and lighter weight, bombers will probably go for those targets and leave her alone. Does that seem like a viable role for her?
 
Makes me wonder: if Soryu operates with bigger and more visible carriers, or even battleships, perhaps as a fighter carrier given their smaller size and lighter weight, bombers will probably go for those targets and leave her alone. Does that seem like a viable role for her?

I suspect that this would depend on the enemy planes' axis of attack. If Soryu happens to be the closest aircraft carrier some of the USN dive bombers and surely most of the torpedo bombers will attack it. Of course there can be other factors as confusion in the coordination (as it happened at Midway) or meteorology (rain) that could change this.

I would expect USN attacking Dauntless to try to hit the aircraft carriers first as per doctrine and leave the battleships for later.
 
I suspect that this would depend on the enemy planes' axis of attack. If Soryu happens to be the closest aircraft carrier some of the USN dive bombers and surely most of the torpedo bombers will attack it. Of course there can be other factors as confusion in the coordination (as it happened at Midway) or meteorology (rain) that could change this.

I would expect USN attacking Dauntless to try to hit the aircraft carriers first as per doctrine and leave the battleships for later.
Put her in between two bigger targets, then - say Shokaku and Zuikaku. Harder to get past those and they are more tempting targets too.

Possible formation for an alternative after-Midway situation in which Soryu did not participate in the battle and thus was not sunk: three carriers in line, Shokaku then Soryu then Zuikaku. A Kongo on each side to provide AA support. Soryu provides CAP over the whole force and some extra strike escorts while the Cranes focus on processing strike bombers and a few fighters.

Thoughts? Less likely to attack the Blue Dragon, and she can keep company with the Cranes as they have a similar speed.
 
Put her in between two bigger targets, then - say Shokaku and Zuikaku. Harder to get past those and they are more tempting targets too.

Possible formation for an alternative after-Midway situation in which Soryu did not participate in the battle and thus was not sunk: three carriers in line, Shokaku then Soryu then Zuikaku. A Kongo on each side to provide AA support. Soryu provides CAP over the whole force and some extra strike escorts while the Cranes focus on processing strike bombers and a few fighters.

Thoughts? Less likely to attack the Blue Dragon, and she can keep company with the Cranes as they have a similar speed.
Theoretocally it would not differ much as USN strkeplanes often choose not just the biggest target, but whatever they could hit with a high percentage of dealing damage. Note that the Zuiho was knocked out early in the battle, while there were larger carriers in her taskgroup (Shokaku & Zuikaku) at Santa Cruz. Basically any ship looking like a CV was being attacked normally, as size was often very difficult to make up at a distance and especilaly from aircraft, that also had to fly through cloads, void enemy fighters and so on. The Japanese did something simmilar normally and for example, at Coral Sea an oiler was misidentified as a CV and attacked as well as a result.
 
Complete Data Here.

Summary.

Navy
Rank
Order
Total
sub.
lost
Total ton.
ships sunk
by sub.
Total
number
ships sunk
No. ships
sunk per
sub. lost
Ton. ships
sunk
per
sub. lost
1
USA
52​
5.2M​
1314​
23​
101,923​
2
Britain
75​
1.52M​
697​
9.3​
20,266​
3
Germany
781​
14.5M​
2,828​
3.6​
18,565​
4
Italy
82​
1M​
NA​
NA​
12,195​
5
Japan
127​
.907M​
184​
1.4​
6,923​
6
Russia
109​
402,437​
160​
1.5​
3,692​

The Germans were inefficient and ineffective.

They fought a naval war against the British and Canadians who were losing it, and then add the Americans. Tide turned. Mainly because of the Canadians in the West Atlantic who carried on and taught the Americans how it was to be done. British? How did coastal command and western approaches do before the victory in 1943? NTG.

As for the Pacific, see previous comments. The British were a non factor. The Med, where the RN did most of its sub fighting was "mixed results." The British submarine arm was unable to cut Italian SLOCs, though they did inhibit a good chunk of traffic. Reason? Italians were the best ASW practitioners among the Axis, naval geography and the British misused their boats.
You do know that the Allied Submarine Ace of Aces was British right?
David Wanklyn sank a greater tonnage than Richard O'Kane.

Of course neither of them was even close to Otto Kretschmer.
Also your own source points out that "...the U-Boat arm faced the most efficient anti-submarine force operating in WW2, namely the Royal Navy." The most successful Anti-Submarine commander of WW2 was Captain Johnnie Walker RN.

You also seem to be missing that the British Sank 2.4 Million tons of Axis Shipping in the Mediterranean, Submarines are not the whole story, and did cut the Italian SLOC. By 2nd El Alamein the tonnage of supplies delivered had dropped to a thirteenth of its peak. (I suggest Alamein by Stephen Bungay for a succinct analysis) And that was heavily dependant on Air-Supply. Italy lost 72% of its entire merchant tonnage in the campaign.
 
Theoretocally it would not differ much as USN strkeplanes often choose not just the biggest target, but whatever they could hit with a high percentage of dealing damage. Note that the Zuiho was knocked out early in the battle, while there were larger carriers in her taskgroup (Shokaku & Zuikaku) at Santa Cruz. Basically any ship looking like a CV was being attacked normally, as size was often very difficult to make up at a distance and especilaly from aircraft, that also had to fly through cloads, void enemy fighters and so on. The Japanese did something simmilar normally and for example, at Coral Sea an oiler was misidentified as a CV and attacked as well as a result.
So basically, Soryu is a death trap unless they make her look like a battleship. Hmm...

1614513586526.png


Zuiho's camo at Leyte comes to mind. Mind you, that didn't save her.
 
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