Effects of a Chinese dynasty adopting a more participatory political structure in the 14th century

[Crazymachines]

Glossing over how such a system would actually come into place, how would china fair if it adopted a political system such as this after overthrowing the Yuan dynasty? how would this affect Chinese domestic and foreign policy, and change the power dynamics in East Asia?

(Note: The Grand Library of Jiangning is a learning institution similar to the OTL house of wisdom in Baghdad)

 

[Madhukar_Shah]

The first thing I notice is the system of military commands being elected by the army- that seems like a good way for a general to overthrow all other "branches of government" as they're only accountable to the military. A quick succession of barracks emperors i suppose.

 

[Crazymachines]

The first thing I notice is the system of military commands being elected by the army- that seems like a good way for a general to overthrow all other "branches of government" as they're only accountable to the military. A quick succession of barracks emperors i suppose.

I don't see how making military officers accountable to their subordinates would increase the risk of a military coup above historical levels

 

[MahBoi]

I don't see how making military officers accountable to their subordinates would increase the risk of a military coup above historical levels

There is something to be said for the fact that military commands will go to whoever is popular with their subordinates, rather than who is actually suited for the role. Commanders might engage in populist politicking to get elected, and with the backing of their soldiers, they seize control of the state.

If you have a commander imposed on a troop of men, it's unlikely they'll follow them into a coup, and they'll likely be loyal ones chosen by the government.

 

[Crazymachines]

There is something to be said for the fact that military commands will go to whoever is popular with their subordinates, rather than who is actually suited for the role. Commanders might engage in populist politicking to get elected, and with the backing of their soldiers, they seize control of the state.

If you have a commander imposed on a troop of men, it's unlikely they'll follow them into a coup, and they'll likely be loyal ones chosen by the government.

another question then; why risk the unknown over the devil you know? backing a new dynasty in a coup might backfire spectacularly, as it very well could backstab the lower ranking officers, strip away the democratic army structure, and the militaries influence within the Central Yuan

 

[MahBoi]

another question then; why risk the unknown over the devil you know? backing a new dynasty in a coup might backfire spectacularly, as it very well could backstab the lower ranking officers, strip away the democratic army structure, and the militaries influence within the Central Yuan

I mean it's possible they might feel that way. It's also possible they might feel stupid or ballsy enough to seize control of the state, then only they get a say in what's going on, not those civilian whatsits. It would be a shortsighted idea, but the world practically runs on shortsighted decisions made for short term personal gain. All it takes is enough dummies or assholes in the right spot at the right time.

 

[John7755 يوحنا]

I would like to mention that this sort of system goes against the prevailing ordinances that govern Chinese societal thought in terms of government. Despite popular view, the Analects and other writings have less importance to government organization than the more obscure yet vastly important 'Rites of Zhou.' Within the Rites of Zhou, the most important quality mentioned therein is that the official should be appointed due to his merit or otherwise the 'appropriate person for the position.' Elective roles would be seen for what they are in this sort of society, attempt asserting a populistic and or dictatorial governance that otherwise abolishes the unified imperial court. If a commander or official is elected based upon popularity, the common axiom would be that the situation is unjust because the right person was not chosen based upon virtue, but instead by the charisma of the candidate, which as we know is a despised quality in the Imperial Court.

Additionally, the Rites of Zhou stipulated the idea that the palace affairs and military affairs should never mix except in the person of the monarch who possesses both. By deposing the authority of the Emperor over the army and also give the army the ability to appoint officials in the Yuan, you break probably the most important axiom of the Rites of Zhou and hence create taboo. Indeed, Dong Zhou, Yuan Shao and many other Chinese leaders or figures are most reviled for their influence in meddling between palace and military affairs and the system outlined earlier is indeed a breach of this custom.

 

[Crazymachines]

I would like to mention that this sort of system goes against the prevailing ordinances that govern Chinese societal thought in terms of government. Despite popular view, the Analects and other writings have less importance to government organization than the more obscure yet vastly important 'Rites of Zhou.' Within the Rites of Zhou, the most important quality mentioned therein is that the official should be appointed due to his merit or otherwise the 'appropriate person for the position.' Elective roles would be seen for what they are in this sort of society, attempt asserting a populistic and or dictatorial governance that otherwise abolishes the unified imperial court. If a commander or official is elected based upon popularity, the common axiom would be that the situation is unjust because the right person was not chosen based upon virtue, but instead by the charisma of the candidate, which as we know is a despised quality in the Imperial Court.

Additionally, the Rites of Zhou stipulated the idea that the palace affairs and military affairs should never mix except in the person of the monarch who possesses both. By deposing the authority of the Emperor over the army and also give the army the ability to appoint officials in the Yuan, you break probably the most important axiom of the Rites of Zhou and hence create taboo. Indeed, Dong Zhou, Yuan Shao and many other Chinese leaders or figures are most reviled for their influence in meddling between palace and military affairs and the system outlined earlier is indeed a breach of this custom.

I'm aware that this breaks a lot of societal and cultural conventions within Imperial China. however, my question was how this political system would function once in place and how it would affect internal and broader East Asian politics, not whether it was plausible to be implemented in the first place

 

[SealTheRealDeal]

(Note: The Grand Library of Jiangning is a learning institution similar to the OTL house of wisdom in Baghdad)

Why are you importing the House of Wisdom model when China already has the long-since established tradition of the scholar gentry?

another question then; why risk the unknown over the devil you know?

Because this is the 1300s and the vast majority of the army is made up of illiterate peasants who will jump when they hear populist promises of higher pay and/or land to retire on.

 

[kholieken]

Glossing over how such a system would actually come into place, how would china fair if it adopted a political system such as this after overthrowing the Yuan dynasty? how would this affect Chinese domestic and foreign policy, and change the power dynamics in East Asia?

(Note: The Grand Library of Jiangning is a learning institution similar to the OTL house of wisdom in Baghdad)

however, my question was how this political system would function once in place and how it would affect internal and broader East Asian politics,

It wouldn't function at all ? Likely it would result inunstable scholar-gentry oligarchy, since they provide officials in all three elected branch ? it wouldn't have any effect on East Asia dynamic, Chinese would continue to behave like previous dynasty despite weird new system.

 

[Avrorrange]

It wouldn't function at all ? Likely it would result inunstable scholar-gentry oligarchy, since they provide officials in all three elected branch ? it wouldn't have any effect on East Asia dynamic, Chinese would continue to behave like previous dynasty despite weird new system.

One benefit I could potentially see would be the ability of the state to have more effective collection of taxes by the magnates.If the land owners passed the taxes themselves they could be willing to pay it.But that’s just being optimistic.Could very well result in less privileged classes being forced to pay them.

 

[Crazymachines]

It wouldn't function at all ? Likely it would result inunstable scholar-gentry oligarchy, since they provide officials in all three elected branch ? it wouldn't have any effect on East Asia dynamic, Chinese would continue to behave like previous dynasty despite weird new system.

The Confucian Scholar Gentry is cordoned off to one third of one part of the government system; the 'grand library' and its allotted seats within the yuan. The army drafts its lowest members from the peasant population. and while passing an exam is required to enter the lowest levels of administrative government, unlike OTL they aren't going to be grilling potential magistrates on the Confucian classics and their skill at calligraphy when most of them are going to spend their entire careers resolving cow ownership disputes between various rice farmers.

Also, I find it blatantly ridiculous to say that China suddenly becoming one of the most democratic polities in the world (for the time period), and certainly the most democratic in East Asia, wouldn't massively affect the power dynamics both internally and abroad

 

[Crazymachines]

Why are you importing the House of Wisdom model when China already has the long-since established tradition of the scholar gentry?

I'm not, actually. It was a useful shorthand turn of phrase to help people quickly understand the basic concept. I imagine the grand library functions as a central headquarters and coordinating apparatus for the Confucian scholar gentry, not as a replacement to it

 

[kholieken]

The army drafts its lowest members from the peasant population.

Military officers has to have certain level of education and wealth. Studying seven military classics, archery, and horsemanship is not cheap. And soldier votes would be de facto controlled by officers class, you couldn't just plant voting tradition suddenly.

and while passing an exam is required to enter the lowest levels of administrative government, unlike OTL they aren't going to be grilling potential magistrates on the Confucian classics and their skill at calligraphy when most of them are going to spend their entire careers resolving cow ownership disputes between various rice farmers.

I honestly think these wouldn't be possible. Scholar-gentry would control exam and appointment. And you can't be successful officials in China without support of local gentry.

Chinese officialdom is not that deep to village level, magistrates govern hundred of thousands of people. It would take modern bureaucracy, multiple civil war, and massive social change before modern chinese bureaucracy could get that deep to village level.

Also, I find it blatantly ridiculous to say that China suddenly becoming one of the most democratic polities in the world (for the time period), and certainly the most democratic in East Asia, wouldn't massively affect the power dynamics both internally and abroad

It couldn't be successfully democratic. And foreigner wouldn't understand what happened from outside. It would like just weird new rites to secure Imperial support from old scholar-gentry classes.

It took hundred of years for Western European to develop parliaments. Democracy took another hundreds of years. Chinese couldn't change social structure that suddenly.

 

[Xavier]

Military officers has to have certain level of education and wealth. Studying seven military classics, archery, and horsemanship is not cheap. And soldier votes would be de facto controlled by officers class, you couldn't just plant voting tradition suddenly.

Indeed, the generals would likely end up going after the Imperial throne like popular Roman generals often did. The first one to succeed would probably also immediately scrap the whole election thing.

I honestly think these wouldn't be possible. Scholar-gentry would control exam and appointment. And you can't be successful officials in China without support of local gentry.

Chinese officialdom is not that deep to village level, magistrates govern hundred of thousands of people. It would take modern bureaucracy, multiple civil war, and massive social change before modern chinese bureaucracy could get that deep to village level.

IIRC the Han dynasty imperial bureacracy ceased to exist below the Xian (county) level, so areas of ~2000km² & 30-40000 people (probably at least double that by the time of this Zhou dynasty). So any dispute over a few cows would be handled by the village elders.

It couldn't be successfully democratic. And foreigner wouldn't understand what happened from outside. It would like just weird new rites to secure Imperial support from old scholar-gentry classes.

It took hundred of years for Western European to develop parliaments. Democracy took another hundreds of years. Chinese couldn't change social structure that suddenly.

Hundreds of years, while having various forms of royal councils to start from, and guilds & oligarchic republics in the cities. And to my knowledge, China indeed has none of those to serve as examples or starting points.

As the system proposed above would be utterly alien to the Chinese, you would have a scholar class irritated that they have to share power, local entities becoming more powerful (no longer having magistrates appointed from above), raising the chances of cessession, and as already mentioned, the generals risk starting a coup as they are now populists chosen by their men, but without any oversight from the government.

 

[chornedsnorkack]

Indeed, the generals would likely end up going after the Imperial throne like popular Roman generals often did. The first one to succeed would probably also immediately scrap the whole election thing.


IIRC the Han dynasty imperial bureacracy ceased to exist below the Xian (county) level, so areas of ~2000km² & 30-40000 people (probably at least double that by the time of this Zhou dynasty). So any dispute over a few cows would be handled by the village elders.

That is actually not correct for Han dynasty.
The Donghai commandery reports mention 2202 or 2203 officials in an area with 1,4 million people. A lot of them were "ting zhi" - apparently formally appointed officeholding village clerks, though the terms of their recruitment and remuneration is not clear to me. There also were township levels, and township level clerks.
Han dynastly had a total of some 130 000 officials.
There was some distinction between the mass of lower officials and middle/higher level officials, but the formal reports grouped both together.
In the Song, Yuan, Ming and Qing dynasties, clerks ("li") continued to exist in large numbers - but the distinction between clerks and mandarins ("guan") strengthened. The histories seem to report number of mandarins alone, omitting clerks, and it sees that by late Ming the government had lost track of how many clerks there were - true number of clerks was no longer reported.
This development, however, happened in fits, starts and reversals.
By 1600, China had an unknown number of clerks, but probably over 200 000 - over 100 clerks per county
By 1600, China had around 500 000 "scholars" ("shengyuan"). So around 400 scholars per county.
But importantly, these two groups, in OTL Ming and Qing, had minimal overlap, and rivalry attested even since Han. Under the Ming-Qing rules, the clerks were formally barred from taking exams. A modest number of scholars took employent as clerks, but this entailed permanently giving up the status of scholar.
Since the 500 000 scholars were recruited by exams, and several times that number took the exam, repeatedly, it was logistically feasible to hold the exams for shengyuan status (at prefecture level).
Which means it could have been feasible to recruit clerks by exams - testing not mainly Confucian classics, but practical literacy and numeracy.
There were political reasons why Ming did not, but another regime might.

 

[Sarthak]

Hundreds of years, while having various forms of royal councils to start from, and guilds & oligarchic republics in the cities. And to my knowledge, China indeed has none of those to serve as examples or starting points.

The Chinese did have royal councils. The Ming called it the Grand Secretariat. The Qing called it the Deliberative Council of Princes and Ministers before renaming it the Grand Council. Like the French, German and Scandinavian Legislatures during the Early Modern Age and Rise of European Empires, Emperors had last say on all matters absolutely but otherwise they were the highest non-emperor authority in the land. During Civil Wars, and infant Emperors, the Grand Secretariat gained a lot of power. The Ming war against the Qing and the Japanese during the Imjin War was basically handled by the Grand Secretariat alone administratively and during the time of the Qing Yongzheng Emperor, the Deliberative Council held a lot of power.

The Chinese also had guilds - there were called monopoly companies. The Salt Monopoly Company, Fur Monopoly Company and the Jade Monopoly Company which churned out sailors, hunters and miners in the hundreds of thousands are prime examples of that in Imperial Chinese history.

With the right PoDs, especially with most of the monopolies having been established pre-1500 and the Grand Secretariat being established in 1380, you could easily create a path for a fledgling parliamentary/legislative semi-democracy to grow natively in China like it did when council structures enforced in Native American tribes such as the Iroquois and Sioux - who were far less intricate but still managed to create fledgling early democratic states with their council systems.

 

[chornedsnorkack]

The Chinese did have royal councils. The Ming called it the Grand Secretariat. The Qing called it the Deliberative Council of Princes and Ministers before renaming it the Grand Council. Like the French, German and Scandinavian Legislatures during the Early Modern Age and Rise of European Empires, Emperors had last say on all matters absolutely but otherwise they were the highest non-emperor authority in the land. During Civil Wars, and infant Emperors, the Grand Secretariat gained a lot of power.

There were other examples available for a 14th century person in China.
Han dynasty had had court conferences ("tingyi").
And Yuan dynasty had had Kurultai.