Sir John Valentine Carden Survives. Part 2.

So if he is to jump ship it will more than like be to save his own skin.
If he had a pain au chocolate rather than a croissant for breakfast it's because he thinks it'll benefit him.
But I think he has objectives beyond saving his skin, de Gaulle was a much more junior officer and his position as leader of the Free French is hardly secure.
 
If he had a pain au chocolate rather than a croissant for breakfast it's because he thinks it'll benefit him.
But I think he has objectives beyond saving his skin, de Gaulle was a much more junior officer and his position as leader of the Free French is hardly secure.
Given if he jumped ship, he has a large army as well as controlling a part of Africa which is considered part of Metropolitan France he does have a strong bargaining postion.
 

Orry

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Given if he jumped ship, he has a large army as well as controlling a part of Africa which is considered part of Metropolitan France he does have a strong bargaining postion.

And nobody not called De Gaul likes De Gaul.........
 

Ramp-Rat

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A number of people have made comments regarding British actions, during the Great Depression, and rearmament in subsequent years. Yes Britain followed classic economic theory, imposing hard austerity, tight money control, and an attempt to balance the budget. Note this was while retaining what was for its time a generous welfare state. Yes there was the means test, which to our eyes was an unwarranted intrusion into family life, and the requirement for the claimant to attend the Labour Exchange every day. However what is often missed, are the factors that to an extent mitigated, the worst effects for the government stringiness. If the claimant didn’t smoke, drink or gamble, and gave all his Dole to his wife, and moved into the family home one or other of his or hers parent’s. Remember the parents State Pension, didn’t count towards the family income, when calculating the means test. Plus the depression saw a reduction in food prices, while there was no reduction in the amount of the state pension, which made the pension more valuable than it had been. Such that meany families, who didn’t move granny or grandpa into the home, but sent one or more of the children round to their house for dinner. Yes times were hard, but in comparison to the USA, no were near as hard. The principal effect of the New Deal, and other American policies, was to prolong the depression, until British and French armament spending in 1939, ended it.


In Britain as others have pointed out the worst of the depression was over by 1932, and unemployment was by 1937, back at the level it had been prior to 1929. Yes there were areas that it took until the war for the depression to end, in fact even the war didn’t see some areas recover. But they were mostly areas that had been in decline, with old inefficient industries pre 1929. Other areas were there were new modern industries saw growth, as did the building trade, especially in the south and around major industrial cities. As for military spending, it’s no good looking at the Army, the British Army was historically the poor relation, always getting the scraps from the table. And the formation of the RAF, another highly technical force like the RN, meant that there was even less to spare for the Army. Given the prevailing government attitude, of no involvement in a continental war, the Armies job was colonial policing. It had even lost to a large extent the job of supporting the civil power at home, that role had passed to the police. Other than for a short time immediately after the Wall Street crash, the British government spent significant monies on the RN. Constructing new ships within the restrictions of the Washington/London treaties, and refurbishing/refitting older ships. It also spent significant money on research for both the RN and RAF, along with training via apprenticeships of highly skilled tradesmen. It managed by the outbreak of war to have established the worlds only integrated air defence system, and the fighters to equip it. The RN, had started to equip its ships with both air search, surface search and gunnery control Radar. While even the poor relation the Army had its first mobile air search sets, not very good or integrated with the command system. And remember the best tank of the early war years was British, nothing could stand up to the Matilda, until the Germans equipped their tanks with a 50mm gun in late 1940.

RR.
 
The US M1 Medium of 1928, 21 tons, 3 man turret.
mediumtankm1front.jpg

57mm gun, coax 30 and cupola with a .30 for the TC.
Then the US got dazzled by Walter Christie and his super fast lightly armored and armed tanks, and went down that rabbit hole for the early 1930s.
Can we be sure that's the M1 and not the M1921 (from which the former was developed?
 
So there is a really big piece of the puzzle being overlooked by those discussing British interwar tank design and development. After the end of WW1 the Hundred Days was studied quite extensively. Specifically the British looked at what elements lead to a successful attack. The components they looked at were Infantry attacks backed up with a combination of Artillery, Tanks and Aircraft. The findings are quite interesting, I will say that I am getting a lot of these figures from memory and will try to find the actual figures and edit them in later. The general order is, I am positive, correct.
Firstly and unsurprisingly Infantry only attacks failed more than they succeeded, in fact they were only successful around 30% of the time. Next Combined arms attacks involving Infantry, Artillery, Tanks and Aircraft succeeded over 90% of the time. Again this should not be surprising, true combined arms is the way forward after all. The interesting thing however that Infantry attacks supported only by Artillery were significantly more successful than Infantry attacks supported by Tanks. IIRC the Tank supported attacks were around or just over 50-50 whereas the Artillery supported attacks pushed 70% effective.

Next we have to consider the type of tanks that formed the Backbone of the British armoured forces in WW1. The heavy tanks, principally the Mk IV, and the lighter Medium Mk A Whippet. Of the heavy tanks the females armed with machine guns only were often seen as more useful than the males armed with the 6pdr. The tanks had separate roles also, the heavies broke through the enemy lines and the Whippets ran amok behind the lines. These are in essence the genesis of the Infantry and Cruiser tanks of WW2. Now I know some or most of that won't be new information to most of you but it does give you the starting point of the British tank development and the operational data that was likely fairly important.

Now much has been said already about the severely limited finances of the inter war army. What I think is often overlooked is the relative starting points of the "modern" tanks of the British and Germans for the start of WW2.
The Germans started designing the Panzer 1 in 1932 and took 2 years to develop it. They then immediately moved onto the Panzer 2 and spent 2 more years developing that tank. Also the Germans spread the production of these tanks out to a number of firms meaning that they had a decent number of firms with tank design, development and manufacturing experience who could look to design and build the Panzer 3 and Panzer 4, the main fighting tanks. Now compare that to the British who had Vickers designing and making their own tanks starting in 1934 with the Cruiser Mk 1 and Mk 2 though the death of Sir John Carden seems to have basically side-lined Vickers in the tank development game. Next You have Nuffield wo go from the Cruiser Mk 3 starting development in 1936 to the Cruiser Mk 4 starting development in 1937 (IIRC) to the Crusader starting development in 1939. Vulcan got into the tank design game in 1937 but took an age with the Matilda 2. Basically the point is that not only was there less development time in total, the development of all the tanks was notably less and the firms often designing the tanks lacked the required experience and expertise.
Despite that Britain still had some very good tanks at the start of WW1, the Matilda was excellent and the Cruiser tanks were at worst adequate and at best very good.

Now the Gun, why the 2pdr. Well for a start it is what was available and it was excellent. Even up until mid war it was effective at punching holes in Europe and was always up to the task in the Pacific. Secondly remember the lesson from WW1, tanks with machineguns were more effective than tanks with cannon. Why do you think British tanks had all those stupid little turrets on them after all? The thing is despite the lesson being that machine guns are more useful the British still specified a cannon for the one task an MG cannot fulfil, killing tanks. The lesson from WW1 was clear, Artillery is king. Everyone always talks about machineguns in WW1 but they weren't that deadly. Sure they were useful but what you really needed was artillery. Where the machinegun really came into it's own was up close, either as a light, man portable machine gun such as the Lewis gun or when mounted on a tank. If you want the real scandal of British pre WW2 procurement it was the decision to not immediately start work on the 6 pounder after the 2 pounder was ready. That decision alone was, IMHO, one of the biggest factors in the mid war stagnation and obsolescence of British tanks. Had work started in 1936 when the 2 pounder was completed then Britain has the 6 pounder by 1938 in all likelihood. That is before work starts on tanks like the Crusader and Churchill and it means that production of that gun should be well under way before Dunkirk. That not only prevents the delay in getting the 6 pounder into service but also makes it likely that the tanks designed after it is complete will take it into consideration when they are specified and designed. This probably means more armour and a bigger turret ring to take the 6 pounder.

The TLDR is that despite getting a late start the British did design some decent tanks in the pre war period. They took on board lessons from actual combat and tried to update them as best as possible. In addition the equipment they were given was very good and better than that found in other armies of the period. The only real and glaring failing is the decision to not continue arms development of the anti tank guns in 1936 after the 2pdr is completed. The 2 year delay was IMHO one of the biggest missed opportunities and probably contributes massively to the British tank malaise of the mid war period.
 
Except they DID have wartime experience on the need for good HE throwers. Its why they built 'male' tanks in WW1.
That was the navy installing 6 pounder guns in 'their' tank design because basically they had no real idea what was needed and the guns were available

It was based on the 6 pounder Hotchkiss gun that was found as secondary anti torpedo boat armament on warships.

And of course if you are the only ones with a tank - no need for anti tank weapons

If you look at what everyone else was doing in the late 30s beyond machine gun armed tankettes - we see 37mm, 40mm, 45mm and 47mm armed AFVs

Then we see a number of 'Infantry support tanks' such as the PzIV with its short 75mm and paper armour, the British building CS tank (Chemical / Smoke) versions of their main designs and the French with the large Char B - but these were secondary in number compared to the 'anti tank' gun armed vehicles.

So in the main its guns in the 2 pounder range

Now most of the nations went a bit further than the British in providing HE shells for their 2 pounder style weapons - and while the Russians probably did the best we are still looking at relatively small HE Charges - pretty much Hand Grenades in effect.

Its only when the tank designers were able to build large enough tanks able to mount longer cal weapons in the 75mm range in a turret which did not really happen until 1941/42 that we see a happy compromise in gun calibre.
 
That was the navy installing 6 pounder guns in 'their' tank design because basically they had no real idea what was needed and the guns were available
Britain found that the Machine gun armed female tanks were more effective than the cannon armed male tanks in WW1. Partly this was due to the lack of suspension making aiming on the move almost impossible so spray and pray was a viable tactic for tank machine gunners. Also even when stationary the machineguns were more easily able to switch targets and engage large groups of infantry much easier.

That machineguns were more effective is the reason more female Mk IV tanks were built (over 500) compared to male Mk IV tanks (just over 400). It was only after the Germans started to use tanks in quantity that Males came back into "favour" and even then it was usually a 50-50 split male to female. Then you get the hermaphrodites with one sponson having a cannon and one a machine gun.
 
The Italian Army had planned to send an Expeditionary Corps to support Operation Barbarossa, the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union. The losses in East and North Africa had left Mussolini’s military advisors arguing that Libya needed to be reinforced rather than sending ill-equipped troops to Russia. With a great deal of reluctance, Mussolini agreed, and despite the losses in shipping across the Mediterranean, most of the men two Divisions (50th Regina, 52nd Torino Infantry Divisions) arrived to reinforce the remaining Italian troops. Not all their heavy equipment had arrived, and very little fuel had made it through the British blockade.
Well, on the bright side, they at least won't end up in gulags.
 
24 November 1941. Libya. Operation Crusader Day 23

...

General Weygrand, the French Governor of Algeria, and Commander in Chief of French North Africa, had increased the French colonial army in North Africa from 30,000 to 180,000 men, not all, but many were fully equipped with tanks, machine guns, trucks, and artillery. He had plans to increase the army further by raising a large number of Senegalese troops.
Not sure how he managed to get an extra 150,000 troops to Tunisia? I believe the armistice terms were rather severe in the size of the Metropolitan Army only 94,000 max. Algeria was allowed only 50,000 and Morocco 55000. To get to the 180,000, Morocco and Algeria would have to be stripped to dangerous levels as well as a sizeable portion of the Metropolitan Army shipped across the Med. The Armistice Commission observers would hardly be expected to fail to notice what was happening.
As for tanks etc, the Metropolitan Army was prohibited tanks and IIRC there were barely 200 tanks across all of North Africa.
 
What I don't understand is if the British in WW1 worked out they couldn't have fast and tough and a big gun, why did they persist in this attitude when the available engines to them were larger and more powerful. Is it all down to the railway constraint?
 
What I don't understand is if the British in WW1 worked out they couldn't have fast and tough and a big gun, why did they persist in this attitude when the available engines to them were larger and more powerful. Is it all down to the railway constraint?
The engines existed, but mostly for aircraft. Maybe it was because the RAF was a separate force?
 
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